JOINT DOCTRINE – The Interoperability Framework

Second Edition – Consultation Copy

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NB: The format used within the document is for consultation purposes only. Content is structured into numbered sections. Line numbers are listed to the left margin of each page. Please use the section number and line number(s) when providing feedback in any consultation response.

1 Introduction to Joint Doctrine and Guidance

The structure for managing the local multi-agency response to emergencies is based upon the Civil Contingencies Act (2004), which imposes a legal duty on Category 1 responders to assess risk, plan for emergencies and to co-operate and share information with other emergency response organisations. The Act is supported by two sets of guidance; 'Emergency Preparedness' and 'Emergency Response & Recovery' (ER&R). Emergency Preparedness deals with the pre-emergency (planning) phase. ER&R describes the multi-agency framework for responding to and recovering from emergencies in the UK.

This publication complements ER&R by focusing on the interoperability of the emergency services and wider responders in the early stages of response to a rapid onset localised incident. Its purpose is to provide commanders with a framework to enable them to effectively respond together. The principles described are applicable to all Category 1 and 2 responder organisations and they can be applied to all incidents, wide-area emergencies, and pre-planned operations where a multi-agency response is required.

This Joint Doctrine sets out the way responders should train and operate and is built upon a common backbone which defines terminology, principles and ways of working. Joint Doctrine sets out guidance on what responders should do and how they should do it in a multi-agency working environment, in order to achieve the degree of interoperability that is essential to a successful joint response. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to inform, explain and guide.

The Joint Doctrine is an essential element in the hierarchy of guidance shown in *Figure 1-Emergency Response Documentation Hierarchy for the emergency services*. It provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on what actions they should undertake when responding to multi agency incidents of any scale.

The guidance contained within this publication should be reflected consistently within individual organisations' policies and procedures, which should be reflected in their training programmes. Separate publications set out specialist ways of working that will apply in specific circumstances such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRNe) incidents or Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks (MTFA). These specialist response documents reflect the generic guidance contained within this publication.

Law (Civil Contingencies Act)

Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response & Recovery

Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework

| Specialist - for example: CBRN, Humanitarian Assistance & Mass Casualties | Joint Standard Operating Procedures and Aide Memoires | Single Service Materials (Policies & Procedures) |

Figure 1- Emergency Response Documentation Hierarchy for the emergency services

2 The need for interoperability

33 The emergency services will usually be the first to arrive at the scene of a spontaneous
34 incident. In order to achieve the best possible outcomes, **all** responders will need to be able
35 to work together effectively as soon as they arrive at the scene.

36 The requirement for a joint response is not new: the findings and lessons identified by many
37 public enquiries and inquests have highlighted cases where the emergency services
38 specifically should have worked better together and shown much greater levels of co-operation
39 and co-ordination. This requirement for better co-ordination and co-operation between the
40 police, fire and ambulance services leads this document to focus on those services, however
41 it also emphasises the requirement to work in a joint and coordinated approach with other
42 responding organisations[1].

43 Interoperability is defined as the extent to which organisations can work together coherently
44 as a matter of routine. To ensure interoperability exists between the emergency services and
45 wider responders in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland which might involve cross-
46 border and mutual aid at any time, all responder organisations must make certain that their
47 single service response arrangements, and local procedures, are in alignment with this Joint
48 Doctrine and in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and its associated guidance.

49 Organisations should ensure that commanders, at every level, should be able to demonstrate
50 that they have received appropriate interoperability training in both their preparation and
51 response arrangements to ensure the highest possible levels of joint working. With appropriate
52 training and exercising between the emergency services, as well as other Category 1 and 2
53 responders, the joint response will be significantly more effective in saving lives and reducing
54 harm.

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[1] For the purposes of the Joint Doctrine, responding organisations are defined as any agency which is involved in the response
to an incident, by either sending personnel to the scene or by otherwise supporting or enabling the response to the incident.

3   Common terminology in emergency management

56 One of the barriers to achieving greater levels of interoperability, and specifically the
57 attainment of shared situational awareness, is the use of terminology that either means
58 different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services.
59 Defining and then sticking to commonly understood terminology is <u>essential</u> for joint working
60 to be successful.

61 Emergency responders must always be aware of the risk that their own understanding of
62 concepts and specific terms is either not shared, or is misunderstood, by others. To alleviate
63 the potential for ambiguity and misunderstanding this document promotes the use of plain
64 English where the potential for confusion exists.

65 The established Civil Protection lexicon of common terminology[2] is an authoritative reference
66 point for terminology in emergency management, defining terms of critical significance to
67 interoperability. There is also an associated set of common map symbols for civil protection[3].
68 Emergency services and other responders are encouraged to cross-reference definitions
69 given in their own organisation's documents and to adopt the common definitions which are
70 contained in the lexicon. Such convergence on common terminology is a fundamental building
71 block for interoperability.

72 In some cases specific terms or acronyms can have two or more meanings. This is not
73 desirable, as there is potential for confusion which could have serious consequences in the
74 response to an emergency. This reinforces the point that in spite of tools such as the lexicon,
75 achieving commonly understood terminology is the responsibility of emergency responders on
76 the ground. Where there is any doubt at all about what is meant by a specific term then
77 individuals should check and confirm there is common understanding – the lexicon is an
78 enabler, but meaningful interaction between emergency responders will make it work in
79 practice.

80 There are a number of terms that are commonly used in this document which are fundamental
81 to successful joint working. All responders, regardless of organisation and rank should
82 understand these. The definitions and a short explanation of each term can be found in Annex
83 J.

4   Ways of Working

85 All personnel involved in the response to an emergency or pre-planned event should be
86 suitably trained and equipped to carry out and discharge the duties they are assigned to, and
87 this is regardless of the role or function that they undertake.

88 It is possible that during the early stages of an incident response, employees of one service
89 may spontaneously carry out tasks that are normally the responsibility of another. However,
90 as soon as sufficient personnel are in place, unequivocal command and control arrangements
91 for all relevant functions should be put in place.

92 Local Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or similar instructions/directives should include
93 direction that promotes joint working to take place with partner agencies. Such SOPs will need
94 to focus on specific actions and considerations, as necessary, for the discharge of specific
95 functions. However, these instructions should also make clear, at the outset, the paramount

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[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/168057/Civil_Protection_Common_Map_Symbology_V1-0_March_2012.pdf

96   need to work jointly with multi-agency commanders and to avoid any short-fall, duplication or
97   conflict of effort between different responder organisations.

4.1   Principles for Joint Working

99   The principles should be applied by responders when they are determining an appropriate
100   course of action. They should be reflected in joint or standard operating procedures and
101   contingency plans for joint working in the response to and co-ordination of an incident[4]. Figure
102   2 below illustrates the five joint working principles.

103

Co-locate
Co-locate with commanders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location near to the scene.

Communicate
Communicate clearly using plain English

Co-ordinate
Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead service. Identify priorities, resources and capabilities for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings

Jointly understand risk
Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures

Shared Situational Awareness
Shared Situational Awareness established by using METHANE and the Joint Decision Model

Figure 2 - Five principles of joint working

104   The public expects that the emergency responders will work together in order to preserve life
105   and reduce harm at any incident.

106   The purpose of clear, simple principles is to help commanders to take action under pressure
107   that will enable the achievement of successful outcomes. This simplicity is of paramount
108   importance in the early stages of an incident, when clear, robust decisions and actions need
109   to be taken with minimum delay in an often rapidly changing environment.

110   At the scene, the expected sequence of actions would comprise the first meeting of
111   commanders (co-location); a joint assessment of the situation and prevailing risks
112   (communication, joint assessment of the risks and shared situational awareness); and a co-
113   ordinated plan for action.

4.1.1   Co-location

115   The co-location of commanders is essential. It allows those commanders to perform the
116   functions of command, control and co-ordination, face to face, at a single, jointly agreed
117   location. This is known as the Forward Command Post (FCP[5]), it is where the response to the

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[4] The term 'incident' is used in a generic sense throughout this document to refer to events involving the deployment of emergency responders. It does not necessarily imply the declaration of a major incident, or an emergency as defined under the CCA. The key point is that the interoperability guidance contained in this document applies, and is important, in any joint response to an incident, irrespective of scale.

[5] FCP - A location near to the scene, where the response by the emergency services is managed.

118 incident is managed. The sooner common objectives and a coordinated plan are established,
119 the more effective the incident resolution will be.

120 It is imperative that face to face communications be established as soon as practicable. Where
121 there is any form of delay in commanders co-locating, Interoperable Communications should
122 be used to begin enabling shared situational awareness.

123 Both operational and tactical commanders of each service should be easily identifiable at an
124 incident, this is usually achieved through the wearing of role specific tabards[6], with the
125 exception of public order and other specialist incidents where coloured epaulettes and helmet
126 markings are used.

127 Whilst not all responding agency staff will have role specific tabards, they should, as a
128 minimum wear appropriate personal protective equipment and identification indicating their
129 name, organisation and preferably their position or role.

130 4.1.2 Communication

131 Communication is the passage of clear, unambiguous and timely information relevant to an
132 incident. Meaningful and effective communication between emergency responder
133 organisations and individuals underpins effective joint working. The sharing of information,
134 free from acronyms and other potential sources of confusion, across service boundaries is
135 essential to operational success. This starts through pre-planning and between Control Rooms
136 prior to the deployment of resources (see page 22 for Control Room joint working).

137 The ability to exchange reliable and accurate information i.e. critical information about
138 hazards, risks and threats, as well as understanding each organisation's responsibilities and
139 capabilities is essential. The understanding of any information shared ensures the
140 achievement of shared situational awareness which underpins the best possible outcomes of
141 an incident. Where terminology and symbols are used amongst responders, they should be
142 commonly agreed and understood. Further information about terminology and symbols can
143 be found in the Civil Protection Common Map Symbology document[7]

144 This guidance is not intended to provide specific advice on the technical solutions for
145 communication that are available to emergency responders, however guidance is provided in
146 the control room section on how best to use communications platforms available to emergency
147 responders to support an interoperable response.

148 4.1.3 Co-ordination

149 Co-ordination involves commanders discussing and making decisions on the priorities,
150 resources, future decision making and response activities of each agency, including their
151 integration in order to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and
152 promote successful outcomes. Effective co-ordination generally requires one service to act in
153 a "lead" capacity, such as chairing co-ordination meetings and ensuring the best possible
154 response.

155 The attending services will discuss which agency should lead the response, however some
156 types of incidents may have specific guidance highlighting which agency should take the lead
157 role. Even where there is existing guidance, a joint decision will still be made and documented

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[6] http://www.jesip.org.uk/incident-commander-tabards

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/168057/Civil_Protection_Common_Map_Symbology_V1-0_March_2012.pdf

158 as to who the lead agency is, considering factors such as the nature of the incident, the phase
159 of the response and the capabilities required.

4.1.4 Joint Understanding of Risk

161 Risk arises from threats and/or hazards which will be seen, understood and treated differently
162 by different emergency services. In the context of a joint response, sharing information and
163 understanding about the likelihood and potential impact of risks and the availability and
164 implications of potential control measures will ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that
165 the agreed aim and objectives are not compromised. This will include ensuring the safety of
166 responders and mitigating the impact of risks on members of the public, infrastructure and the
167 environment.

4.1.5 Shared Situational Awareness

169 This is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences and
170 implications of the emergency, together with an appreciation of the available capabilities and
171 emergency services' priorities. Achieving shared situational awareness (SSA) is essential for
172 effective interoperability. Shared situational awareness relates not only to a common
173 understanding between incident commanders, but also between control rooms and all tiers of
174 the command structure.

5   Information Assessment and Management

176 Decision making in emergency management follows a general pattern of:

177   (i) work out what is going on (situational awareness);

178   (ii) establish what you need to achieve (direction and strategy); and

179   (iii) figure out what to do about it (decision making and action).

180 The Joint Decision Model on page 14 is organised around these three primary considerations.

181 Answering these questions, illustrated below, may require special arrangements for decision
182 makers to be supported in managing and analysing information from a range of different
183 sources. These points are illustrated further in Figure 3 below.


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Figure 3 - General pattern of decision making

185 These are challenging questions that are likely to require information inputs from a range of
186 sources, and skills and resources to assess, analyse and apply them to the task in hand.

187 In many incidents there will neither be time nor any need for formal arrangements to be set up
188 to support decision makers.

189 Some incidents however will be highly complex and strategically significant, involve
190 considerable levels of uncertainty, hard-to-predict consequences and unclear choices.

191 Under these circumstances there will be a need to implement pre-established arrangements
192 to manage information and support multi-agency decision-making at the tactical (TCG) and
193 strategic (SCG) levels.

Situational Awareness (What?)
- **What** has happened, what is happening now and what is being done about it?
- **So what**? What might be the implications and wider impacts of this be?
- **What might** happen in the future?

Direction (Where to?)
- **Ends**: What are we trying to *achieve*, what is the desired end state?
- **Ways**: What options are open to us and what *constarints* apply?
- **Means**: What *capabilities* are available to us to realise our objectives?

Action (What now?)
- What do we need to do *now*?
- What do we need to *find out*?
- Whats do we need to do *next*?
- What do we need to *communicate*?
- what *might* we need o do in the future?
- **What if?** What cointingencies could arise and if so what options apply?

194

Figure 4 - general stages of decision making in incident response

195 The following paragraphs outline the capabilities that emergency responders should
196 establish to inform and support joint decision making. They cover the need for a **common**
197 **operating platform**, to enable information sharing and application; **common processes**,
198 to report, assess and manage information in a consistent manner; and a **common**
199 **operating picture** as the basis for shared situational awareness.

200 ## 5.1 Common Operating Platform

201 A Common Operating Platform is the means to share and collaboratively manage information
202 to support joint decision-making. Any commonly understood and effective system can be
203 described as a common operating platform, but the advantages of electronic systems are
204 considerable. So, while a common operating platform does not *necessarily* require an
205 electronic, technical system to create and maintain it, automating aspects of the data sourcing,
206 fusion, analysis and display will make for a more efficient and effective process and product.

207 The precise form of a common operating platform will reflect local requirements and existing
208 capabilities, but users are referred to ResilienceDirect for a widely-used and secure platform
209 with a range of functions that support joint working[8].

5.2 Common Processes

211 An organisation responding to a crisis or incident needs to be able to[9]:

212   a) Gather relevant information on the incident;
213   b) Evaluate that information in terms of quality and relevance to the incident;
214   c) Filter, analyse and make sense of that information;
215   d) Communicate the information within the organization and externally as required;
216   e) Present information to decision makers in an appropriate form.

217 Where emergency responders use consistent ways of working to carry out these tasks then
218 interoperability will be enhanced. The following paragraphs outline the need to adhere to
219 **M/ETHANE** as a reporting framework for use in major and other incidents; adopt a common
220 framework for **information assessment**; and implement a **Multi-Agency Information Cell** to
221 support decision makers when a systematic and collaborative approach is required.

5.3 M/ETHANE Framework for Situation Reporting

223 The M/ETHANE model (set out in Table 1 below) is well established as a reporting framework
224 for use in major incidents. It is recommended however that it is adopted for all incidents
225 involving a multi-agency (i.e. more than one emergency responder) response.

226 For incidents falling below the Major Incident threshold it will in effect be an ETHANE report,
227 but the M should serve for responders to periodically consider whether a developing incident
228 still falls below the Major Incident threshold. This will provide a common structure from
229 responders to their control rooms which will greatly assist in the building of Shared Situational
230 Awareness.

231 Each responding agency should send an M/ETHANE message to their respective control
232 rooms at the earliest opportunity. This will preferably be done by the first resource on scene
233 in order to speed up the attainment of situational awareness. The information contained in
234 M/ETHANE can then easily be shared between control rooms and responders on scene to
235 enable the establishment of **shared** situational awareness.

Major Incident	Has a major incident or standby been declared?	Include the date and time of any declaration.
Exact Location	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.
Type of Incident	What kind of incident is it?	E.g. flooding, fire, utility failure, CBRN, MTFA or disease outbreak.

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[8] See www.resilience.gov.uk

[9] Source: British Standard on Crisis Management (BS11200:2014)

Hazards	What present and potential hazards can be identified?	Consider likelihood and potential severity of impact.
Access	What are the best routes for access and egress?	Include information on inaccessible routes and RVPs.
Number of casualties	Numbers and types of casualties	Use an agreed classification system e.g. P1, P2, P3 and dead.
Emergency services	What and how much emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are on-scene?	Consider the requirement for assets of wider emergency responders (e.g. local authorities, voluntary sector).

236 **Table 1 - Note - The examples above are not exhaustive but for illustration only**

237 ## 5.4 A Framework for Information Assessment

238 The assessment of information received, using established criteria, will establish its quality
239 and suitability for the task in hand. This is critical to ensure that decision-making is based on
240 the best possible information, and to establish a common understanding of where critical
241 uncertainties lie.

242 In an emergency or crisis much of the information received by decision makers is going to be
243 unreliable or of uncertain quality. For that reason a framework is needed to distinguish
244 between:

245 • Information that can confidently be relied upon;
246 • Information that is unreliable in some way; and / or
247 • Information of unknown quality.

248 Where partners make use of the same information assessment framework then interoperability
249 will be enhanced.

250 The framework presented in Figure 5 below uses the acronym RATSC, each letter relating to
251 a key dimension of information quality. The dimensions are:

252

Figure 5 - a framework for information assessment[10]

253 There are no 'right answers' to the questions set out in the assessment framework above.
254 Decision makers will need to work together and use their joint experience and judgement when
255 using this framework to ensure the information they are using is both suitable and adequate,
256 as they develop a Common Operating Picture. Where decision makers are concerned or
257 dissatisfied with the assessment of information then they should issue clear direction and take
258 steps to update, reconcile, check or seek further information, potentially drawing on other
259 channels and sources.

260 The behaviour and effectiveness of interaction between individuals and teams will either
261 enable or impede the development of Shared Situational Awareness. Where people freely
262 share what they know, explicitly identify uncertainties and assumptions, challenge their own
263 and others' understanding of what they are being told and behave in a manner that is critical
264 and rigorous then the attainment of Shared Situational Awareness becomes considerably
265 more likely.

266 ## 5.5 Multi-Agency Information Cell

267 Emergency services and LRFs should develop the capability to support (when activated) both
268 a Tactical Coordinating Group and a Strategic Coordinating Group through information
269 management and the formation of a Common Operating Picture (see below). This should be
270 formalised as a Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC).

271 Not all incidents involving a TCG or an SCG will necessarily require an Multi-Agency
272 Information Cell to be established at the outset, but the multi-agency response to complex
273 and/or long-running incidents should be supported in this way.

274 The Multi-Agency Information Cell, which may come together in either a physical, co-located
275 form, or virtually, should have the capability to source, access, analyse, display and
276 disseminate situational information, drawing on information and expertise from a range of
277 emergency responders, not just one single organization. Both co-located and virtual

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[10] Note that much more complex and sophisticated frameworks for information assessment do exist in other lines of work, but the framework presented here focuses on the key elements of relevance to decision making in emergency management.

278 arrangements for a Multi-Agency Information Cell should make use of ResilienceDirect as the
279 common platform, or another suitable system.

280 While the Multi-Agency Information Cell will be activated in support of a TCG and/or SCG, its
281 effectiveness will depend upon established and rehearsed capabilities, including a familiarity
282 and access to pre-defined Essential Elements of Information[11] (EEIs), handling Requests for
283 Information (RFIs), assessment of incoming information (see the RATSC framework) and the
284 effective use of available toolsets, most likely including Geographical Information Systems for
285 the display and analysis of map-referenced data.

5.6   Common Operating Picture

287 Shared Situational Awareness is achieved when those involved in the joint response to an
288 incident share information and collaborate to build a common understanding of the situation,
289 in relation to three fundamental questions:

290   ● **What?** What has happened, what is happening now & what is being done about it?
291   ● **So what?** What might the implications and wider impacts of this be?
292   ● **What might** happen in the future?

293 The development of a Common Operating Picture is a means to the attainment of Shared
294 Situational Awareness, answering the questions above, providing a single point of reference
295 for those involved, and as a basis for supporting joint decision-making. A core function of the
296 Multi-Agency Information Cell will be to produce the Common Operating Picture, to inform and
297 support the TCG, SCG and other responders as appropriate.

298 A Common Operating Picture is defined as: 'A common overview of an incident that is created
299 by assessing and fusing information from multiple sources, and is shared between appropriate
300 command, control and coordination groups to support joint decision-making'.

301 The form of the Common Operating Picture will depend upon local requirements and practices.
302 In some contexts the Common Operating Picture might be the same thing as a completed
303 SCG SITREP[12]. In other contexts the Common Operating Picture might be a dynamic
304 dashboard that provides an overview of the incident, using maps and graphics as well as text.
305 In this form a Common Operating Picture would be would be updated as events and inputs
306 change and also as the results of further work (e.g. analysis to answer *so what?* or *what might?*
307 questions) become available. The Common Operating Picture should have a clear relationship
308 with established Command, Control and Coordination (C3) Groups, including the Science and
309 Technical Advice Cell (STAC), and be accessed through a suitably resilient and secure
310 Common Platform.

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[11] EEIs are pre-identified elements of information that are likely to be required in most or all foreseeable activations, in this case of the MAIC. They are likely to include information on the local environment (e.g. hazards such as COMAH sites or reservoir inundation zones, vulnerable institutions such as schools and care homes, critical infrastructure and resources such as pre-identified rest center sites), baseline data such as population distribution, other infrastructure data such as roads and railways and land-use data held by local authorities.

[12] https://www.the-eps.org/media/events/_master/212/files/141216

6   Decision Making

312   Decision making in incident management follows a general pattern of:

313   a)   work out what's going on (situation),
314   b)   establish what you need to achieve (direction) and
315   c)   decide what to do about it (action), all informed by a statement and understanding of
316   overarching values and purpose.

317   The sequence of these stages, and associated questions, is illustrated in Figure 3 - General
318   pattern of decision making on page 8.

6.1   Joint Decision Model (JDM)

320   The Joint Decision Model (JDM), shown at Figure 6, has been developed to enable this
321   reconciliation when decisions are being made jointly by agencies, particularly, but not only, in
322   tactical and strategic co-ordinating groups (TCGs and SCGs). One of the difficulties facing
323   commanders from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring
324   together the available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make
325   effective decisions together.

326   Agencies may make use of various processes and sources of information, including single
327   service decision making guidance/processes in order to feed information and planned
328   intentions into the JDM. Once objectives are agreed using the JDM, agencies may use such
329   models to subsequently plan and implement specific activities.

330   The JDM follows the general pattern shown in Figure 3 above, although broken down into
331   additional stages. The first priority is to gather and assess information and intelligence, and
332   for responders to work together to build shared situational awareness, recognising that this is
333   a continuous effort as the situation, and responders' understanding of it will change over time.
334   Understanding the risks is a vital complement to shared situational awareness, enabling
335   responders to answer the three fundamental questions of what, so what and what might[13]?

336   With the answers to these questions informing Shared Situational Awareness, the desired end
337   state should be agreed as the central part of a joint strategy. Strategy is a widely, and not
338   always consistently, used term[14]. A strategy should set out what a team is trying to achieve,
339   and how they are going to do it. More precisely it is defined as a high-level statement of the
340   desired *end state* and the *ways* and *means* of achieving it. For related definitions see appendix
341   1, especially the end state, or what situation the effort is intended to bring about, ways in
342   relation to options and constraints, and means in relation to available resources and
343   capabilities.

344   When a Strategic Coordinating Group is convened, they will agree and share the joint strategy
345   for the multi-agency response as a whole. Individual responders' strategic command teams
346   should then review and amend their single-agency strategy in a way that is consistent with the
347   joint strategy and supports the attainment of the jointly defined end state, or overarching aim[15].

348   Determining how to work towards the desired end state will reflect the available capabilities,
349   powers, policies and procedures (means) and the options, constraints and contingencies

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[13] These questions are elaborated as: What has happened, what is happening now and what is being done about it? So what - what might the implications and wider impacts of this be? What might happen in the future?

[14] Definition of STRATEGY: a high level statement of the desired end state and the ways and means of achieving it.

[15] Definition of AIM: *a short, precise and measurable statement of the desired end state which an effort or activity is intended to bring about.*

350 (ways) that arise from these. Ways and means are intimately related – some options will not
351 be viable because there is insufficient capability to implement them, or they may be technically
352 and logistically feasible, but illegal or ethically indefensible.

353 The JDM develops these considerations and sets out the various stages of how joint decisions
354 should be reached. One of the guiding principles of the JDM is that decision makers will use
355 their judgement and experience in deciding what additional questions to ask and
356 considerations to take into account, to reach a jointly agreed decision. They should therefore
357 be free to interpret the JDM for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances
358 facing them at any given time. Strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the JDM
359 should always be secondary to achieving desired outcomes, particularly in time sensitive
360 situations.

361 A detailed and well-practised understanding of the JDM will facilitate clear and ordered
362 thinking under stress, and is applicable under both rapid onset and rising tide emergencies.
363 The following sections summarise the questions and considerations that commanders should
364 think about in following the model.

365

Figure 6 - Joint Decision Model

366 **6.2 Working Together – Saving Lives, Reducing Harm**

367 Joint decisions should be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any
368 response to an emergency: to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through a co-
369 ordinated, multiagency response. Decision makers should have this uppermost in their minds
370 throughout the decision making process.

371 ## 6.3   Gather and share information and intelligence

372 Situational awareness is about having appropriate answers to the following questions: what is
373 happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being
374 done about it? In the context of the JDM, <u>shared</u> situational awareness becomes critically
375 important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by sharing information and
376 understanding between the organisations involved, to build a stronger, multi-dimensional
377 awareness of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

378 For all emergencies, whether a rapid onset or a rising tide event, it is a simple fact that no one
379 responder organisation can initially appreciate all relevant dimensions of an emergency. This
380 deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between the
381 emergency services and other responders. This should be built upon sustainable
382 preparedness arrangements which include Joint training and exercising programmes, agreed
383 procedures around information sharing and a commitment to use commonly understood
384 terminology rather than service specific jargon which may impede global understanding across
385 responders. In simple terms, commanders cannot assume other responding organisation's
386 personnel see things or say things in the same way, and a sustained effort is required to reach
387 a common view and understanding of events, risks and their implications.

388 Decision making in the context of an emergency, including decisions involving the sharing of
389 information, does not remove the statutory obligations of agencies or individuals, but it is
390 recognised that such decisions are made against an overriding priority to save life and reduce
391 harm.

392 The sharing of personal data and sensitive personal data (including police intelligence)
393 requires further consideration before sharing across agencies and the JDM can be used as a
394 tool to guide decision making on what to release and to whom. In particular, in considering the
395 legal and policy implications, the following are relevant:

396 • A legal framework to share information is required – in an 'emergency' situation this will
397 generally come from Common Law (save life/property), the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
398 or the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
399 • Formal Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) may exist between some or all
400 responding agencies but such existence does not prohibit sharing of information outside
401 of these ISAs
402 • There should be a specific purpose for sharing information
403 • Information shared needs to be proportionate to the purpose and no more than
404 necessary
405 • The need to inform the recipient if any of the information is potentially unreliable or
406 inaccurate
407 • The need to ensure that the information is shared and handled appropriately and in line
408 with any specific handling instructions, and it should comply with the Government
409 Classifications Scheme[16] if appropriate
410 • What information is shared, when, with whom and why, should be recorded.

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[16]   https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251480/Government-Security-Classifications-April-2014.pdf

411 ## 6.4   Jointly Assess Risks, Develop a Working Strategy

412 A key task for commanders is to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range
413 of risks and the way that those risks may be increased, reduced or controlled by decisions
414 made and subsequent actions taken. In any incident the responding agencies will each have
415 unique insights into those risks and by sharing what they know, a common understanding can
416 be established.

417 The joint assessment of risk is the process by which commanders share what information they
418 have of the known or perceived threats or hazards and the likelihood of them being realised,
419 in order to build a common understanding and make informed decisions on deployments and
420 the risk control measures that are required.

421 Risk control measures to be employed by individual services also need to be understood by
422 the other responding organisations in order to ensure any potential for unintended
423 consequences are identified in advance of activity commencing. A joint assessment of the
424 prevailing risks also limits the likelihood of any service following a course of action in which
425 the other services are unable to participate. This, therefore, increases the operational
426 effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as the probability of a successful
427 resolution of the incident.

428 The working strategy is not to be confused with the overarching strategy provided by the SCG
429 or Strategic Commanders, this will generally be issued sometime into the Incident response
430 and almost certainly not before the Tactical or Operational levels of command have been
431 established.

432 The working strategy is the plan which responders will develop and agree jointly and put into
433 place to address the immediate situation and risks that they are faced with in order to save life
434 and reduce harm.

435 It is rare for a complete or perfect picture[17] to exist for a rapid onset incident, therefore the
436 working strategy should be based on the information available at the time. The following
437 should be taken into account when developing a working strategy:

- **What**   Are the aims and objectives to be achieved?
- **Who by**   Police, Fire, Ambulance and partner organisations?
- **When**   Timescales, deadlines and milestones?
- **Where**   What locations?
- **Why**   What is the rationale? Is this consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- **How**   Are these tasks going to be achieved?

438

439 To support the development of a safe and effective strategy and any multi-agency response
440 plan in dynamic or complex environments commanders should consider sharing single service
441 dynamic risk assessments through joint meetings. Commanders should take into account
442 other services' risk assessments to underpin joint understanding of risk and shared situational
443 awareness.

444 The development of a working strategy, for a rising tide, pre-planned event or where
445 commanders have the ability undertake an analytical joint risk assessment will remain based

---

[17] 'Picture' is used here in a general sense, but equally this could apply to a formal Common Operating Picture which is equally
challenging to build, assure and sustain in support of strategy and decision making in a dynamic incident.

446 on the information available at the time. However, the following should be taken into account
447 when developing a working strategy:

448 • Sharing of single service risk assessments
449 • Recording and agreement of joint risk assessments in an agreed format

450 In order to deliver an effective integrated multi-agency operational response plan, there will
451 need to be jointly agreed objectives and priorities. Each agency will then prioritise their plans
452 and activity accordingly. In order to do this the following key steps should be undertaken:

453 • **Identification of the tasks** - each individual agency should identify and consider the
454 specific tasks to be achieved according to its own role and responsibilities. These tasks
455 should then be evaluated in the context of the incident.
456 • **Identification of hazards** – this will begin from the initial call received by a Control Room
457 and will continue as first responders arrive on scene. Information gathered by individual
458 agencies should be disseminated to all first responders, Control Rooms and partner
459 agencies effectively.
460 • **The use of the mnemonic M/ETHANE** will assist in a common approach.
461 • **Dynamic Risk Assessment** – undertaken by individual agencies, reflecting the tasks /
462 objectives to be achieved, the hazards that have been identified and the likelihood of harm
463 from those hazards. The results of this process should then be shared with other agencies
464 involved.
465 • **Apply risk control measures** – each agency should consider and apply appropriate
466 control measures to ensure any risk is as low as reasonably practicable. The hierarchy of
467 risk control measures following the ERICPD mnemonic [18] may be useful to agree a
468 coordinated approach.
469 • **Integrated multi-agency operational response plan** – the development of this plan
470 should consider the outcomes of the hazard assessment and service risk assessments,
471 within the context of the agreed priorities for the incident. Where the activity of one agency
472 creates hazards for a partner agency a solution must be implemented to reduce the risk
473 to as low as reasonably practicable.
474 • **Recording of decision**– the outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be recorded,
475 together with the jointly agreed priorities and the agreed multi-agency response plan, when
476 resources permit. It is acknowledged that in the early stages of the incident this may not
477 be possible, but it should be noted that post-incident scrutiny inevitably focuses on the
478 earliest decision making. A sample Joint Decision Log template can be found in Annex H.

479 **6.5 Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures**

480 Decision making in an emergency will be focussed on how to achieve the desired end state
481 and there will always be various constraints and considerations that will shape how this is
482 achieved.

483 Powers, policies and procedures relate to any relevant laws, operating procedures or policies
484 that may impact on the desired response plan and the capabilities that are available to be
485 deployed. They may impact on how individual services will need to operate and co-operate in
486 order to achieve the agreed aims and objectives. In the context of a joint response, a common
487 understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential in

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[18] ERICPD: **E**liminate, **R**educe, **I**solate, **C**ontrol, **P**ersonal Protective Equipment, **D**iscipline.

488 order that the activities of one service compliment and do not compromise, the approach of
489 the other services.

6.6 Identify Options and Contingencies

491 There will almost always be more than one option to achieve the desired end state and it is
492 good practice that a range of options are identified and rigorously evaluated. Any potential
493 option or course of action should be evaluated with respect to:

494 • **Suitability**   Does it fit with the strategic direction?
495 • **Feasibility**   In resource terms can it be done?
496 • **Acceptability**   Is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

497 Whichever options are chosen, it is essential that commanders are clear what they are
498 required to carry out and there should be clearly agreed procedures for communicating any
499 decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic.

500 Contingencies relate to events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to
501 respond to them should they occur. For example, strong evidence may suggest that an
502 emergency is being successfully managed and the impacts safely controlled, but there
503 remains a likelihood that the situation could deteriorate with significant impacts. Simply hoping
504 for the best is not a defensible option and a contingency in this case may be to define
505 measures to adjust the response should the situation deteriorate.

6.7 Apply Decision Controls, Then Take Action and Review What Happened

507 Building shared situational awareness, setting direction, evaluating options and taking
508 decisions all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in
509 resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

510 Before moving to the action phase, decision makers should use what are termed decision
511 controls to ensure that the action proposed is the most appropriate. Decision controls are
512 designed to support the decision making process by encouraging reflection and series of
513 considerations shown below. Note that (a) to (d) are intended to structure a joint consideration
514 of the issues, with (e) suggesting some considerations for individual reflection.

515 **a) Why are we doing this?**

516 • To what goals does this link?
517 • What is the rationale, and is that jointly agreed?
518 • Does it support working together, saving lives and reducing harm?

519 **b) What do we think will happen?**

520 • Anticipate the likely outcome of the action, in particular the impact on the
521 objective and other activities.
522 • How will the incident overall change as a result of these actions, what outcomes
523 are expected?

524 **c) Do we have a common understanding and position on the following:**

525 • The situation, its likely consequences and potential outcomes.
526 • The available information, critical uncertainties and key assumptions.
527 • Terminology and measures being used by all those involved in the response.
528 • Individual agencies' working practices as they relate to a joint response.
529 • Conclusions that are being drawn and communications that are being made.

530 **d) In light of the considerations above, is the benefit proportional to the risk?**

531 • Consider whether the benefits of proposed actions justify the risks that would
532 be accepted.

533 **e) Decision-makers should then reflect individually, by asking themselves:**

534 • Does the collective decision accord with my professional instinct and
535 experience?
536 • Have we (as individuals and as a team) applied an appropriate amount critical
537 rigour to the decision?
538 • Are we separately <u>and</u> individually content that this decision is the optimal
539 practicable solution?

540 Once the decision makers are collectively and individually satisfied that the decision controls
541 validate the proposed actions, then these actions should be implemented. As the JDM is a
542 continuous loop, it is essential that the results of those actions are fed back into the first box
543 – Gather and share information and intelligence – which establishes and sustains shared
544 situational awareness. This will, in turn, shape any revision to the direction and risk
545 assessment and the cycle continues.

7   Briefing

547 Once decisions have been made and actions decided upon it is imperative that these are
548 relayed in a commonly understood and structured way to those who will be required to carry
549 them out.

550 It is accepted that in the initial phases of a spontaneous incident that briefings may be
551 structured around the JDM, however as incidents develop past the initial phases or are
552 sufficiently protracted to require a hand over of Commanders then a more detailed framework
553 should be employed. For this reason JESIP recommends the adoption of the IIMARCH format
554 for the delivery of briefings and orders, when operating in a multi-agency context.

7.1   IIMARCH

556 A number of formats, models and templates exist for delivering briefings. IIMARCH (standing
557 for Information, Intent, Method, Administration, Risk Assessment, Communications,
558 Humanitarian Issues) is not the only structured briefing format available, but it is the most
559 widely used and it will apply to almost all situations, providing for an appropriate level of detail
560 against a series of relevant headings.

561 The value of a common framework is considerable in the context of joint operations. If adopted
562 and familiarised before the point it is needed, such a framework will enable participants from
563 multiple emergency responders to efficiently and rapidly understand a situation, activity and
564 associated risks on the basis of a familiar and shared way of working.

565 When using IIMARCH the following should be considered:

Element	Key questions	Considerations
INFORMATION	• What, where, when, how? • How many? • So what? • What might?	• timeline and history (if applicable), • key facts reported using M/ETHANE: **M**ajor Incident (declared or not?) **E**xact Location **T**ype of Incident **H**azards **A**ccess **N**umber of casualties **E**mergency services)
INTENT	• Why are we here? • What are we trying to achieve?	• Strategic aim and objectives • Joint strategy
METHOD	• How are we going to do it?	• Command, control and coordination arrangements • Tactical and operational policy and plans • Contingency plans
ADMINISTRATION	• What is required for effective, efficient and safe implementation?	• Identification of commanders • Tasking • Timing • Decision logs • Equipment • Dress code & PPE • Welfare, food and logistics
RISK ASSESSMENT	• What are the relevant risks? • What measures are required to mitigate them?	• To reflect the JESIP common understanding of risk element, and using the ERICPD[19] hierarchy for risk control as appropriate.

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[19] ERICPD: **E**liminate, **R**educe, **I**solate, **C**ontrol, **P**ersonal Protective Equipment, **D**iscipline.

Element	Key questions	Considerations
COMMUNICATIONS	• How are we going to initiate and maintain communications with all partners and interested parties?	• Radio call signs • Other means of communication • Understanding of interagency communications • Information assessment • Dealing with the Media, develop a joint media strategy and plan
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES	• What humanitarian assistance and human rights considerations arise or may arise from this event and the response to it?	• Requirement for humanitarian assistance • Information sharing and disclosure • Potential impacts on individuals' human rights

566   **Table 2 - IIMARCH considerations**

567   The effective use of IIMARCH can be achieved by employing the following:

568   i.   Brevity is important: if it is not relevant, leave it out

569   ii.   Clarity is vital: communicate using unambiguous language that is free from jargon and in
570   terms people will understand

571   iii.   Consider whether information has been assessed using the RATSC[20] criteria

572   iv.   Common understanding: do not assume people will understand the ideas, terms and
573   acronyms presented to them, explain them and check people understand them.

574   A sample IIMARCH template can be found in Annex I - IIMARCH: A Common Briefing Tool.

575   **8   Control Rooms**

576   Control rooms play a vital role in managing the early stages of a multi-agency incident. A co-
577   ordinated multi-agency response and effective communication cannot occur without control
578   rooms delivering a swift and joint approach to handling these incidents. The requirement for
579   specific control room guidance within the existing **Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability**
580   **Framework** is necessary in order to build consistency into the procedures and working
581   practices of emergency responder control rooms.

582   This guidance sets out how control rooms fulfil an essential role in any incident involving more
583   than one emergency responder agency, highlighting in particular how control rooms, working
584   together, initiate the JESIP principles from the outset. The content herein also defines what
585   responders can expect from their respective control rooms when responding to a multi-agency
586   incident.

587   The control room guidance is divided into three sections which align to and support the JESIP
588   principles:

589   i.   Communication
590   ii.   Shared Situational Awareness and Joint Understanding of Risk
591   iii.   Co-ordination and Co-Location

592   As is the case with the five JESIP principles, this guidance should not be interpreted in either
593   chronological or priority order; rather each element can occur concurrently, with equal
594   importance and interdependence.

---

[20] RATSC: **R**elevance, **A**ccuracy, **T**imeliness, **S**ource reliability, **C**redibility of information.

595 It should be noted that control rooms generally operate from separate fixed locations[21] and
596 therefore they cannot feasibly co-locate; however they can assist with the co-location of
597 responders and commanders by jointly agreeing the initial multi-agency Rendezvous Points
598 (RVP) where this is practical, appropriate and safe.

599 ## 8.1   Communication

600 ### 8.1.1   Supporting Principle 1: Establish a dialogue between control rooms
601 ### supervisors at the earliest point.

602 Initiating a multi-agency discussion (talk not tell) between control room supervisors in the
603 affected control rooms at the earliest opportunity is required so that the process of achieving
604 Shared Situational Awareness can begin.

605 This is done by:

606   a) Sharing information obtained from 999 calls and M/ETHANE reports along with
607   immediate resource availability and decisions taken in accordance with each
608   organisation's own policies and procedures. Due to the unverified nature and range
609   of information sources at this early stage situational awareness may be ambiguous
610   until information can be verified by the first responders at scene.
611

612   b) Using M/ETHANE as a structure for sharing information in the early stages of an
613   incident universally between control rooms and all resources. As the incident
614   develops and a more structured briefing tool (e.g. IIMARCH) is used, elements of
615   the most recent M/ETHANE should be referred to.
616

617   c) Nominating a Single Point of Contact (SPoC) in each control room and establishing
618   a method of all-informed communication between them. This could involve initiating
619   an unbroken telecommunications link or utilising a multi-agency interoperable
620   talkgroup. This will enable the timely passing of information and intelligence that
621   can inform deployment decisions. It will also facilitate the efficient management of
622   a co-ordinated response in deploying key decision-making personnel (i.e.
623   Operational Commanders) to rendezvous with their emergency service
624   counterparts.
625

626   Where a shared talkgroup is being used between the control room SPoCs
627   consideration should be given to maximising Shared Situational Awareness by also
628   inviting responding commanders onto this talkgroup prior to their arrival at scene or
629   other location (example TCG).
630

631   d) Establishing the need for and coordinating the setting up of multi-agency
632   interoperable voice communications for commanders and operational working if
633   required (see Supporting Principle 4 for further guidance).

634 ### 8.1.2   Supporting Principle 2: Use of plain English throughout discussion between
635 ### control rooms.

636 Emergency services and wider responders may not have a full understanding of each other's
637 call sign structures and single service terminology including colloquial references to assets.

---

[21] There are examples of Joint Control Rooms across the UK, however the principles set out in this document should be adhered to irrespective of how control rooms are located and structured.

638 Control Rooms should therefore use plain English without the use of acronyms and single
639 service jargon whenever they are speaking with one another.

640 **8.2 Shared Situational Awareness and Joint Understanding of Risks**

641 **8.2.1 Supporting Principle 3: Proactively contribute to Shared Situational**
642 **Awareness, prior to the arrival of the first on-scene commander and**
643 **throughout the incident. This includes identification of risks and hazards to all**
644 **responders.**

645 In order to develop and maintain Shared Situational Awareness, frequent discussion between
646 control rooms should revisit the following key points:

647 • Is it clear who the lead agency is at this stage? If so, who is the lead agency?
648 • What information and intelligence does each agency have at this stage?
649 • What hazards and risks are known at this stage by each agency?
650 • What assets have been - or are being - deployed at this stage and why?
651 • How are the required agencies going to continue communicating with each other?

652 At what point will multi-agency interoperable voice communications be required and how will
653 this be achieved?

654 ***NB*** It should be noted that organisations should, wherever possible, use electronic data
655 transfer[22] to share information between control rooms. Whilst this reduces congestion on voice
656 channels and eliminates the double keying of information it does not remove the need to
657 establish an early dialogue between the control room supervisors in order to attain Shared
658 Situational Awareness.

659 **8.3 Co-ordination and Co-location**

660 **8.3.1 Supporting Principle 4: Control room supervisors will facilitate multi-agency**
661 **communications and undertake initial actions in relation to management of the**
662 **incident until transfer to commander(s) is possible.**

663 Control room supervisors should co-ordinate continuous communication between control
664 rooms SPoCs by a method agreed as part of the early multi-agency discussion (see
665 Supporting Principle 1). The lead agency should also agree timings of subsequent
666 conversations at control room supervisor level so as to ensure maintenance of Shared
667 Situational Awareness.

668 Control room supervisors should be ready to facilitate the setting up of multi-agency
669 interoperable voice communications for commanders if and when required. A request for using
670 multi-agency interoperable talkgroups should always be put to the Police Control Room for
671 authorisation. Upon identifying which talkgroups are to be used the Police Control Room will
672 then communicate this to the appropriate agencies' control rooms so that the relevant
673 commanders can be informed.

674 The identification of multi-agency interoperable talkgroups is not necessary for every multi-
675 agency incident, however, as a minimum when each service has allocated a commander to
676 an incident, then consideration should be given to the value that could be added by introducing
677 interoperable voice communications:

---

[22] Direct Electronic Incident Transfer (DEIT) and Multi Agency Incident Transfer (MAIT) are the 2 main platforms in use in the UK.

678 Co-location of commanders and face-to-face exchanges will always be the preferred option.
679 However, where this is not possible or practical, interoperable voice communications can
680 provide the means for decision makers to keep each other informed. Where opportunities to
681 co-locate are limited and will only provide occasional snapshots in time then interoperable
682 voice communications should be introduced to enhance the success of multiagency joint
683 decision making.

684 As a guide for when and why the decision should be taken to invoke interoperable voice
685 communications, fundamentally it will be to support the exchange of real-time information,
686 outside of face-to-face contact, for the purposes of:

687 ● *Maximising safety*
688 ● *Supporting joint decision making*
689 ● *Contributing to Shared Situational Awareness*
690 ● *Improving coordination*

691 Whilst the Emergency Service Network provides the capability for all users from different
692 agencies to talk to each other on common talkgroups, in most instances this will not be
693 appropriate and could subvert command, control and coordination. Therefore, JESIP
694 suggests that multi agency interoperable voice communication is used primarily to facilitate
695 communications between incident commanders and or control room supervisors, although
696 practical exceptions to this will always exist.

697 To sustain the critical communications functions and ensure their best use a specialist
698 Operational Communications Advisor from each organisation should be identified to support
699 the incident.

700 Control room supervisors and dispatch personnel should familiarise themselves with the
701 content of Standard Operating Principles and any other arrangements around the
702 identification, activation and use of interoperable voice communications that are in place
703 locally.

704 **8.3.2   Supporting Principle 5: The Lead Agency will provide a suggested location for**
705 **commanders to co-locate in the early stages of the multi-agency response.**

706 Control rooms should not overlook the key role they can have in facilitating co-location. Whilst
707 early location information is unverified and the practical suitability of potential Rendezvous
708 Points (RVP) may be unclear, control room supervisors should jointly agree a preliminary RVP
709 for the initial response and communicate this to commanders without delay. Although
710 commanders may wish to revise the location of an RVP, Forward Command Post (FCP) or
711 both, this should not deter control room supervisors from considering how co-location can be
712 achieved whilst Operational Commanders are travelling to the scene.

713 **9   Levels of Command**

714 **9.1   Tiers of Command**

715 Operational, Tactical and Strategic are tiers of command adopted by emergency responders
716 when responding to incidents. It should be understood that the Operational, Tactical and
717 Strategic relate to the level of command that an individual works, it does not convey seniority
718 of service or rank, although commanders at each level need to have appropriate authority to
719 carry out their responsibilities. The overarching response structure is shown at Figure 3.

720

721

Figure 7- Overarching Response Structure

722 For the purpose of clarity, this document refers only to the generic tiers of command and not
723 individual service specific functional activities. In essence, there should be a clear and
724 identified commander responsible for co-ordinating their service's activity at each of the
725 identified command levels

726 It is essential that the appointed commanders of each service, operating at every level, liaise
727 with each other at the earliest opportunity. Operational Commanders, particularly, should
728 make every effort to achieve the closest co-ordination by meeting face-to-face.

729 **9.2   Operational**

730 Operational commanders will be working with colleagues from other services and agencies.
731 They will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a functional or
732 geographical area and implement the tactical plan as directed by the Tactical Commander
733 Clear communications should be established and maintained so that those working together
734 can do so in a co-ordinated way in pursuit of a common purpose.

735 **9.3   Tactical**

736 Effectively, first responders have to be responsible for tactics in the initial stages of an incident.
737 Once the scale and nature of the incident is known, emergency services will appoint officers
738 to act as tactical commanders for their organisation. Other agencies may also appoint
739 individuals to act as tactical commanders or co-ordinators on behalf of their organisations.

740 Communication and coordination between commanders is critical. Tactical commanders
741 should be located at a mutually agreed location where they can maintain effective joint
742 command of the operation. This includes effective joint working with other services and other

743 factors such as access to communications systems. In some circumstances a visit to the scene
744 may be required.

745 The tactical commander is likely to be in place before the strategic commander and likely to
746 be the first senior officer taking command of the incident. The tactical commander will need to
747 set priorities before the strategic commander has set a strategy.

9.4   Strategic

749 The Strategic Commander in overall charge of each service is responsible for formulating their
750 single agency strategy for the incident. Each Strategic Commander has overall command of
751 the resources of their own organisation, but will delegate implementation decisions to their
752 respective tactical level commanders. At the earliest opportunity, a strategic group will
753 determine/confirm a specific response strategy and record a strategy statement. The roles
754 and responsibilities of Strategic Commanders are shown at Annex D.

755 The structures and responsibilities detailed above need to be activated and put into place as
756 quickly as possible to minimise the consequences of the developing incident as far as is
757 reasonably practicable. Even with the best planning and training this will take some time.
758 Initial responders at a scene are likely to have to determine the initial tactics and implement
759 them, whilst also communicating the need for reinforcement.

760 It is important that all staff that could be first on-scene for their respective service can identify
761 a potential major incident and can understand the implications of declaring one. It is also
762 essential that they can convey incident information using M/ETHANE (see page 11 for
763 M/ETHANE) for this purpose. Early declaration of a major incident begins the process of
764 putting major incident protocols into place resulting in the most effective multi-agency
765 response.

9.5   The Tactical Co-ordinating Group

767 The tactical commanders of all the responding agencies should come together to form a
768 tactical co-ordinating group (TCG). The TCG should meet at an appropriate and mutually
769 agreed location as soon as practicable. The location should be capable of providing
770 appropriate administrative support and should be suitable for holding effective meetings. For
771 some sites, pre-existing locations for TCGs may have already been identified. Tactical
772 commanders should familiarise themselves with any existing local plans.

773 The TCG should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. The
774 meetings should be agreed between the tactical commanders at intervals which ensure
775 continuity in managing the incident without being disruptive to implementing the agreed plans.
776 They should ensure that updates are available for the strategic co-ordination group (SCG), if
777 one is in place. Commanders attending the TCG should be decision makers for their
778 organisation and suitably trained to command. Decisions should be recorded for audit
779 purposes, and a multi- agency decision log should be used.

780 The Joint Decision Model (page 14) should be used as the standing agenda for TCG meetings.

781 Clear lines of communication between responding agencies to the TCG are required. Where
782 agencies are responding at SCG level or above it will be part of the role of the SCG chair to
783 ensure that tactical co-ordination groups are updated with the appropriate information.

784

9.6 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

785

786 The purpose of an SCG is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of
787 the incident and establish the strategic framework within which lower levels of command and
788 co-ordinating groups will work.

789 It will normally, but not always, be the role of the police to co-ordinate activity with other
790 organisations and therefore to chair the SCG. The police are particularly likely to field an SCG
791 chair where there is an immediate threat to human life, a possibility that the emergency was a
792 result of criminal or terrorist activity, or where there are significant public order implications. In
793 other types of emergency, for instance certain health or maritime scenarios, an agency other
794 than the police may initiate and lead the SCG.

795 An SCG may take more than an hour to set up and establish a clear picture of unfolding events.
796 As a first priority it should formulate a strategy with an aim and objectives that will encompass
797 and provide focus for all of the activity of the responding organisations. To ensure that co-
798 ordinated effort is achieved, even before the SCG first meets, a working strategy should be
799 developed by the first responding commanders to promote priority actions. When the SCG
800 meets and gains a full understanding of the situation, they should then review and amend the
801 working strategy and adjust objectives and priorities as necessary.

802 An example of a working strategy that could be used as the default initial starting point is
803 provided in Annex E – Strategic Co-ordinating Group Roles & Responsibilties together with
804 initial objectives and enabling actions for further consideration.

805 The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. The location, at
806 which the SCG meets, with its supporting staff in place, is referred to as the Strategic Co-
807 ordination Centre. This will usually, but not always be at the headquarters of the lead service
808 or organisation.

809 A standard agenda for SCG meetings is attached at Annex F.

9.7 Inter-agency resources

810

811 Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In
812 these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of
813 those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall
814 command of its personnel and equipment at all times. Personnel from one service who help
815 another in this way should only be given tasks for which they are trained and equipped and
816 they should not supplement the other service in a potentially dangerous way.

817 National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are a network of specially trained officers who
818 are qualified to provide advice to commanders from the responding organisations their
819 Service's operational capabilities, limitations and capacity, in order that appropriate risk
820 mitigation measures can be employed to safely resolve incidents.

821   **9.8   Overarching response structure**

822   The details of the operation and co-ordination of emergency response can be found in the UK
823   Government Concept of Operations[23] and the relevant chapters of Emergency Response and
824   Recovery[24].

825   **10 Joint Organisational Learning (JOL)**

826   The lessons identified from debriefing activities are now at the forefront of many key changes
827   within emergency services policy and practices.

828   Evidence shows[25] that issues have frequently been identified but not successfully acted upon
829   to improve effective joint working. It is essential that joint organisational learning is "accepted
830   as the standard" for multi-agency learning and adopted by all emergency responders so that
831   we can continually improve our multi-agency response and interoperability.

832   **10.1 Joint Organisational Learning Arrangements**

833   There is a robust governance structure and process to address joint organisational learning
834   issues. The process includes a method to capture, analyse, implement and share learning
835   from incidents, training, testing & exercising and other external sources. Cat 1 & 2 responders
836   have access to the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) application which is hosted on
837   *ResilienceDirect.*

838   **10.1.1 JOL Process**

839   The process that underpins JOL is based on three stages:

840   1) **Inputs** - *identify what needs to be learnt*
841   2) **Monitoring, analysis and development** - *Act on what needs to be learnt*
842   3) **Implementation & Assurance** - *Share what needs to be learnt and check change*
843   *has occurred*

844   The majority of lessons to be learned are identified during de-brief procedures, it is essential
845   that emergency services and wider responders have robust de-brief procedures and that they
846   have mechanisms in place to identify any interoperability lessons that should be submitted
847   onto JOL.

848   Where appropriate lessons should be submitted onto the JOL Application as soon as
849   practicable, but within reasonable timescales so that any issues which may have national
850   impact or significance can be acted on as quickly as possible avoiding a repeat of the issue.

851   It is important to capture lessons while events are fresh in the minds of those involved. For
852   this reason a joint hot debrief should be undertaken by commanders as soon as practicable
853   following an event. A formal structured de-brief may then be held at a later time. All debriefs
854   should involve the whole breadth of responders and control room staff to ensure lessons are
855   captured from every aspect of the response.

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[23] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192425/CONOPs_incl_revised_chapter_24_Apr-13.pdf

[24] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf

[25] Review of Persistent Lessons Identified Relating to Interoperability from Emergencies and Major Incidents since 1986. Dr Kevin Pollock 2013

856 JOL provides services with a consistent and accountable mechanism to ensure lessons
857 identified from incidents, training and exercising and other external sources are acted upon to
858 continually improve interoperability and to ensure lessons identified become lessons learnt.
859 JOL can also be used to share notable practice. This is where services have found a solution
860 to an interoperability issue they have encountered which works well and that they wish to
861 share for others to benefit from.

862 To support services in capturing interoperability lessons, a debrief template has been
863 developed and can be found on the JESIP website. This template is designed to be either
864 integrated into, or used alongside existing debrief procedures.

865 10.2 Expectations of Cat 1 & 2 Responders[26]

866 Following any multi-agency incident, exercise or training those involved should ensure
867 appropriate de-briefings are scheduled with representation from all those involved in the
868 response and then:

869 • The lead agency for the response should organise a debrief post incident
870 • Ensure that there is a common understanding among attendees of any issues raised
871   during the debrief process.
872 • Capture issues using local multi-agency de-brief procedures alongside the JESIP
873   Interoperability debrief template
874 • Discuss and agree on any interoperability issues[27] that:
875   • fall within the joint emergency services interoperability principles;
876   • impacted the effectiveness of at least two of the response organisations;
877   • that impeded successful interoperability;
878   • are known recurring issues; or
879   • may have a national impact.
880 • Comply with any disclosure requests for information related to the debrief or incident.

881 To continually improve interoperability it is vital that services capture lessons identified from
882 incidents, exercises and training and where those lessons meet the requirements for inputting
883 onto the JOL App then a local process should be adopted to ensure all parties determine who
884 will submit issues on behalf of their service and/or LRF and within appropriate timescales.

885 Full details about the JOL process, what is expected of services and guidance for the use of
886 the App are all available on the JESIP website and on ResilienceDirect.

887 10.2.1 Disclosure and Freedom of Information

888 The disclosure of unused material in criminal cases forms an essential part of any policing
889 investigation[28]. The Police Investigation team are likely to appoint a disclosure officer who will
890 be able to advise on relevant material and disclosure procedures. Decision logs and Debrief
891 information could be subject to disclosure and form part of the unused material.

892 In deciding whether the material satisfies the disclosure test the investigator must pay
893 particular attention to material that has potential to undermine the prosecution case or assist
894 the defence. Material should be made available to the officer in charge and disclosure officer
895 so that an informed decision can be made. Debrief material includes not only the debrief report
896 but also individual feedback and notes made by any party at the de-brief.

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26 JESIP - Joint Organisational Learning, Learning Interoperability Lessons, Guidance Document, 2015

27 Interoperability issues are considered to be an issues occurring when applying the JESIP Principles, the JDM and METHANE

28 It still remains as 'one of the most important – as well as one of the most misunderstood and abused- of the procedures relating to criminal trials' according to Lord Justice Gross (2011).

11 APPENDIX 1 - Information for military responders attending civil emergencies

11.1 Introduction

The need for interoperability between emergency responders extends to other agencies that may be expected to operate with them, including the armed forces. Any contribution by military responders should be seen in a supporting role to the civil responders, who will have primacy throughout. Military responders should be aware of the JESIP principles and will be expected to adhere to the procedures wherever possible. The JESIP Principles are co-location; communication; co-ordination; joint understanding of risk; and shared situational awareness.

11.2 Command and Control

Civil organisations use Strategic, Tactical and Operational for identifying the roles individuals play in the command and control structure. The Strategic commander has overall command of the incident and they are part of the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG). Below this sits the Tactical command level, which functions through a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG), whilst the Operational Commander will work at or very near the scene. This is in contrast to the strategic – operational – tactical structure in UK and NATO military doctrine.

11.3 Co-location

Co-location of commanders is essential and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face-to-face, at a single and jointly agreed location, known as the Forward Command Post. The Joint Decision Model will be used, along with Joint Decision Logs to record actions and decisions. Military log keepers must be aware of this to ensure any military logs and records are consistent.

11.4 Communication

At multi-agency incidents, civil commanders will use interoperability talk-groups; these are held by the emergency services. Military responders should also be included where and when possible to ensure shared understanding. The mnemonic METHANE[29] will be used over communications networks; military units will be expected to use this means to convey important information in situation reports to civil agencies. The use of acronyms and single agency terminology is to be avoided to ensure the passage of clear, unambiguous messages.

11.5 Co-ordination

One of the civil emergency services will generally take the lead role at an incident to ensure an effective response; any military contribution will be in a supporting role to this. It is the duty of the commander of the military unit to identify him/herself at the Forward Command Post (or any other location that they have been asked to attend) and to establish effective co-ordination with the lead civilian responder to ensure tasking is appropriate.

11.6 Joint Understanding of Risk

Commanders of civilian emergency services will ensure the safety of responders by conducting a joint assessment of risk and this will include any military assets where they are under the control of the civilian agencies. However, this does not absolve military commanders from their own assessment of the risks and where necessary, military commanders must decide for themselves that the risks their personnel are exposed to are

[29] METHANE: Major incident declared? Exact location; Type of incident; Hazards present or suspected; Access – routes that are safe to use; Number of casualties; Emergency services present and those required.

938 tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable. If a disagreement occurs between the military
939 commander and the civilian commander, the military commander must inform the military
940 chain of command as soon as possible.

11.7 Shared Situational Awareness

942 The common understanding of the circumstances and immediate consequences of an
943 emergency, together with an appreciation of available resources and capabilities of all
944 response agencies, is critical to success. The use of the mnemonic METHANE by emergency
945 responders allows for the pertinent incident information to be shared in a manner that is easily
946 understood by other agencies. As incidents develop the common briefing tool, IIMARCH[30] will
947 be used by civilian agencies. However in the early stages you may find a briefing delivered
948 fast time around the content of the JDM.

11.7.1 Joint Organisational Learning – Military Contributions

950 Military units are encouraged to contribute to post incident debriefs and ensure that
951 interoperability lessons are captured on the Joint Organisational Learning Application which
952 sits on ResilienceDirect.

11.7.2 Joint Training & Exercising

954 Military units and personnel likely to be involved in providing assistance to civilian emergency
955 services in their area are encouraged to take part in joint learning opportunities to enhance
956 their awareness of the JESIP principles. Local emergency services liaison groups are being
957 established across the country and these present an ideal time to exchange ideas and develop
958 mutual understanding in a conducive atmosphere, before they are likely to meet one another
959 in an emergency situation. The Army's Regional Point of Command (RPOC) brigades will
960 exercise a co-ordinating function in this respect, usually through the network of Joint Regional
961 Liaison Officers (JRLOs).

11.8 Information for civil responders where military involvement is likely:

11.8.1 Command Authority

964 Military personnel deployed to assist with civil emergency agencies will remain under the
965 military chain of command at all times. This means that they may be withdrawn at any time
966 should the military command chain decide that they are required for higher priority tasks. Also,
967 military commanders are authorised to refuse to conduct tasks if they believe they are
968 inappropriate, beyond the scope of the original request for assistance, or put their personnel
969 at undue risk. In these circumstances, the military commander will report the incident to higher
970 authority as soon as possible.

11.8.2 Command and Control

972 Military command and control structure differs from that used by civilian agencies. The military
973 strategic level of command is executed through the Ministry of Defence; the operational level
974 of command will be exercised by the MOD's HQ Standing Joint Commander (UK) based in
975 Andover, whilst Defence's tactical level of command is exercised usually by the Army's RPOC
976 brigade commanders. The Army's RPOC brigade commanders will usually be appointed Joint
977 Military Commanders (JMCs) for an operation in support of the civil authorities in the UK, and
978 in this capacity they may base themselves at the SCG. Additional Military Liaison Officers

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[30] IIMARCH: Information; Intent; Method; Administration; Risk assessment; Communications; Humanitarian issues.

979 (MLOs) will be deployed to the SCG(s) and TCG(s) as appropriate in order to meet the
980 requirements of the operation.

981 **11.9 Defence Fire and Rescue Management Organisation (DFRMO)**

982 DFRMO has limited numbers of personnel and equipment at a number of MOD
983 establishments. Should the incident escalate and involve other Fire and Rescue Services and
984 agencies, DFRMO Incident Command (IC) Policy presents a building block approach to
985 provide a robust Incident Management process. The policy of DFRMO is that the fire officer
986 present from the primary authority will take charge of the incident; if the incident takes place
987 on a military establishment, this will be the DFRMO incident commander. At incidents of
988 special risk i.e. military aircraft, submarines etc. the civil Fire & Rescue Service fire officer will
989 assume the role of overall IC of the incident but will work closely with the senior DFRMO fire
990 officer present, who may assume the role of Tactical Advisor sharing risk critical information.

991 **11.10 Joint Regional Liaison Officer**

992 The JRLO is Defence's primary focus in the regions for the integration of UK military operations
993 with civil authorities, based on the geographic boundaries of the Army's RPOC brigades.
994 During periods of routine they will represent Defence at Local Resilience Fora (LRFs) and will
995 attend all relevant training and exercising events. When a crisis occurs, they may represent
996 the RPOC brigade commander at the SCG or, if the crisis covers a number of LRF areas and,
997 therefore, requires concurrent representation from Defence in a number of areas, the role may
998 be assumed by another MLO nominated by Defence, drawn usually from military
999 establishments or units from within that region. Single-Service liaison officers from the Royal
1000 Navy and Royal Air Force complement the capability and capacity of the JRLO and provide
1001 specialist single-Service advice. The JRLO will be able to provide advice on what military
1002 capability might be available in an emergency situation and how to submit a request.

1003 **11.10.1   Requests for Military Assistance**

1004 If the assistance or support of the armed forces is required for an incident, the usual means to
1005 submit a 'Military Aid to the Civil Authority' (MACA) request is through the SCG to the relevant
1006 lead government department (LGD). For situations where the lead responder on the ground
1007 is the police or Fire and Rescue Service, the lead government department will be the Home
1008 Office; for the ambulance service it will be the Department of Health.

1009 Where the local authority is in the lead the LGD is the Department for Communities and Local
1010 government (DCLG). Slightly different arrangements exist in the devolved areas, although the
1011 LGDs remain the London-based Wales Office, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office. In
1012 circumstances where the emergency response apparatus, such as a strategic ('gold') or
1013 tactical ('silver') co-ordination groups, has not been established, police headquarters will be
1014 able to supply the contact details for the JRLO for each area.

1015 **11.10.2   Emergency Assistance**

1016 If an exceptional emergency situation develops that requires an urgent response from military
1017 units for the purposes of saving life, local commanders are authorised under standing
1018 arrangements to deploy without seeking approval from higher authority. The Defence Council
1019 approves the employment of Service personnel on tasks that are assessed as: *'being urgent*
1020 *work of national importance, such work as is considered by a local commander, at the time*
1021 *when the work needs to be performed, to be urgently necessary for the purposes of the*
1022 *alleviation of distress and preservation and safeguarding of lives and property in the time of*
1023 *disaster...'* Therefore, there is a duty on military commanders to act on their own responsibility
1024 without a request by the civil power where, in very exceptional circumstances, a grave and

1025 sudden emergency has arisen, which in the opinion of the commander demands his immediate
1026 intervention to protect life or property.

1027 **11.11 Further Information**

1028 More details of the role of the armed forces in supporting the civil authorities can be found in
1029 the Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02 at the following link:

1030 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28469/JDP02
1031 Ed2.pdf

1032 A useful addendum has been written specifically for civil authorities and responders:

1033 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdp-02-addendum-to-operations-in-the-uk-the-
1034 defence-contribution-to-resilience

Annex A.   Control Room Roles & Responsibilities

1035

1036 The overarching aim of the Control Room Supervisor is to ensure that rapid and effective
1037 actions are implemented to save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident.

1038 **To achieve this you will need to:**

1039 a) Make an initial assessment of the available information and ensure appropriate resources
1040 are mobilised

1041 b) Determine if the situation requires escalation to your respective service's incident
1042 command structure and take action where appropriate[31]

1043 c) Ensure - where appropriate - that a declaration of a major incident takes place

1044 d) Have an understanding of the role of each agency in the effective sharing and co-
1045 ordination of information available during the early stages of an incident

1046 e) Establish shared situational awareness by agreeing a common view of the situation, its
1047 consequences and potential outcomes and the actions required for its resolution

1048 f) Jointly agree a preliminary Rendezvous Point (RVP) - and Forward Command Post (FCP)
1049 if required - for the initial response and communicate this to commanders without delay

1050 g) Share information using the M/ETHANE structure in the early stages of an incident
1051 between control rooms and all resources involved

1052 h) Co-ordinate continuous communication between control room single points of contact
1053 (SPoCs) by a method agreed as part of an early multi-agency discussion

1054 i) Agree timings for further voice conversations between control room supervisors so as to
1055 maintain Shared Situational Awareness

1056 j) Consider the need for establishing interoperable voice communications at an early stage

1057 k) Understand how continually changing hazards/risks affect each organisation and work
1058 with multi-agency control room colleagues to address them

1059 l) Make and share decisions within your agreed level of responsibility, being cognisant of
1060 consequence management

1061 m) Support the response by ensuring appropriate additional resources are mobilised
1062 including specialist assets and command support roles

1063 n) Update the other commanders with new information and/or intelligence as the incident
1064 progresses

1065 o) Ensure your legal and statutory responsibilities are met in relation to the health, safety
1066 and welfare of individuals from your organisation during the response

1067 p) Maintain accurate records of information known, decisions taken and concise rationale
1068 for those decisions

1069 q) Take a full part in organisational post-incident procedures

1070 r) Consider Joint Organisational Learning

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[31] In some smaller scale incidents it may be appropriate for one or more service to deploy commanders to scene whilst other services maintain command from their control room. When this model is adopted it is important that control room managers acting as commanders work with commanders at the scene in line with the JESIP principles.

Annex B.   Operational Commander Roles & Responsibilities

The overarching aim of the Operational Commander is to ensure rapid and effective actions are implemented that save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident. To achieve this you will need to:

a) Make an initial assessment of the situation and ensure appropriate resources are requested and where appropriate, that a declaration of a major incident takes place (M/ETHANE);

b) Have an understanding of the role of each agency in the effective management and co-ordination of victims, survivors and relatives;

c) Use the JDM to establish shared situational awareness by agreeing a common view of the situation, its consequences and potential outcomes and the actions required for its resolution;

d) Carry out a briefing at the earliest opportunity. Ensure the message is clear and commonly understood, at regular intervals;

e) Convene joint meetings and use the JDM to share and coordinate information, intelligence and operational plans, to ensure multi-agency compatibility and a clear understanding of the initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics;

f) Using the JDM, maintain shared situational awareness through effective communication to all multi-agency organisations, to assist in the implementation of the operational plan;

g) Using the JDM, construct a joint action plan, and priorities necessary for its execution, in sufficient detail for each service to have a clear understanding of the other responders' future activities by nature, location and time. Understand all the multi-agency Operational Commander roles, core responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps);

h) Identify and agree the triggers, signals and arrangements for the emergency evacuation of the scene or area within it, or similar urgent control measures.

i) Using the JDM, conduct, record and share ongoing dynamic risk assessments, putting in place appropriate control measures with appropriate actions and review;

j) Understand how continually changing hazards/risks affect each organisation and work with your multi-agency colleagues to address these issues;

k) Ensure your legal and statutory responsibilities are met and action them in relation to the health, safety and welfare of individuals from your organisation during the response;

l) Make and share decisions within your agreed level of responsibility, being cognisant of consequence management. Disseminate these decisions for action to multi-agency colleagues;

m) Using the JDM, identify and action the challenges your organisation's operational plan may cause multi-agency partners;

n) Determine whether the situation requires the activation of the next level of command support (Tactical Co-ordinating Group) and make appropriate recommendation;

o) Update the Tactical Commander on any changes, including any variation in agreed multi-agency tactics within their geographical/functional area of responsibility;

p) Ensure appropriate support at the scene by your organisation, in terms of communications operatives and loggists - if available NILO support or equivalent should be provided. The amount and type of support will be determined by the incident;

q) Consider organisational post-incident procedures.

r) Consider Joint Organisational Learning

Annex C.   Tactical Commander Key Roles and Responsibilities

The overarching aim of the Tactical Commander is to ensure rapid and effective actions are implemented that save lives, minimise harm and mitigate the incident. The Joint Decision Model (JDM) should be used as the standing agenda for Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) meetings. To achieve the overarching aim, you will need to:

a) Be aware of and understand the multi-agency command structure, commander roles, responsibilities, requirements and capabilities (including gaps) and monitor the operational command structure including functional roles;

b) Determine whether the situation merits the activation of the strategic level of co-ordination and recommend accordingly;

c) Establish a common view of the situation between the responder agencies. Initiate (if appropriate) and identify the chair of a multi-agency TCG meeting at the earliest opportunity, and then at regular intervals, to ensure shared situational awareness;

d) Construct and agree the overall joint intent, objectives and concept of operations for their achievement within a joint plan. At regular intervals assess and disseminate, through the appropriate communication links, the available information and intelligence to properly evaluate threats, hazards, vulnerabilities and own actions in order to establish and maintain multi-agency shared situational awareness and promote effective decision making;

e) Provide accurate and timely information to inform and protect communities, working with the media and utilising social media through a multi-agency approach;

f) Understand how continually changing threats and hazards affect each organisation and work with multi-agency colleagues to conduct joint dynamic risk assessments, putting in place appropriate mitigation and management arrangements to continually monitor and respond to the changing nature of emergencies for your organisation;

g) Ensure your legal and statutory responsibilities are met and doctrine considered in relation to the health, safety, human rights, data protection and welfare of individuals from your organisation during the response;

h) Share and co-ordinate operational plans to ensure multi-agency compatibility and understanding of both the initial tactical priorities and ongoing tactics;

i) Identify and agree a common multi-agency forward control point for all Operational Commanders and remain suitably located in order to maintain effective tactical command of the incident or operation and maintain shared situational awareness;

j) Manage and co-ordinate, where required, multi-agency resources and activities, providing a joined up and directed response;

k) Liaise with relevant organisations to address the longer term priorities of restoring essential services, and help to facilitate the recovery of affected communities;

l) Ensure that all tactical decisions made, and the rationale behind them, are documented in a decision log, to ensure that a clear audit trail exists for all multi-agency debriefs and future multi-agency learning;

m) Facilitate or make available debriefing facilities (supporting the Operational Commander and debriefing them); and

n) Consider Joint Organisational Learning.

Annex D.   Strategic Commander Roles & Responsibilities

The overarching aim of the Strategic Commander is to set the policy, strategy and the overall response framework for the response to the incident. This provides the parameters for the Tactical Command level and the response.

a)   Protect life, property and the environment;

b)   Set, review, communicate and update the strategy, based on available intelligence and the threat and risk;

c)   Attend and possibly chair a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), if established, or consider the need to request that a SCG is set up;

d)   Consult partner agencies and community groups when determining the strategy;

e)   Become involved in making tactical level decisions, where appropriate;

f)   Consider setting tactical parameters within which the Tactical tier can work;

g)   Become involved in briefings where appropriate;

h)   Remain available to other agency Strategic or Tactical tiers of command, to ensure that appropriate communication mechanisms exist at a local, and national level;

i)   Ensure that, where appropriate, command protocols are set, agreed and understood by all relevant parties;

j)   Secure strategic resources in order to resolve the incident and prioritise the allocation of resources, where appropriate;

k)   Ensure that there are clear lines of communication between Category 1 and 2 responders and appropriate agencies;

l)   Review and ensure the resilience and effectiveness of the command team, identify the requirements for assistance from the wider resilience community and manage them accordingly;

m)   Plan beyond the immediate response phase for recovering from the emergency and returning to normality;

n)   Have overall responsibility within the command structure for health and safety, diversity, equality and human rights compliance and ensuring that relevant impact assessments are completed;

o)   Identify the level of support needed to resolve the incident or operation and resource your agency's response;

p)   Have responsibility for the development of communication and media strategies;

q)   Carry out a post-incident hot debrief, and debrief.

r)   Consider Joint Organisational Learning

Annex E.   Strategic Co-ordinating Group Roles & Responsibilities

1. The purpose of an SCG (as set out in the non-statutory guidance contained in Emergency Response and Recovery) is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency and establish the policy and strategic framework within which lower levels of command and co-ordinating groups will work. The SCG will:

    a) Determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly;
    b) Establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation;
    c) Prioritise the requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources accordingly;
    d) Formulate and implement media handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responding agency;
    e) Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.

2. The SCG does not have the collective authority to issue executive orders to individual responder agencies. Each organisation retains its own command authority and defined responsibilities and exercises command of its own operations in the normal way. However, the co-ordinated direction and instructions that the SCG produce will be converted by each responder into appropriate commands down its own command structure and transmitted directly to all subordinate Tactical Co-ordinating Groups. These are well practised and understood arrangements that are used regularly across the country.

    a) It will normally, but not always, be the role of the police to co-ordinate activity with other organisations and therefore to chair the SCG. The police are particularly likely to field an SCG chair where there is an immediate threat to human life, a possibility that the emergency was a result of criminal or terrorist activity, or where there are significant public order implications. Under these circumstances, the same person may be the Police Strategic Commander and the SCG Chair. In other types of emergency, for instance certain health or maritime scenarios, an agency other than the police may initiate and lead the SCG.

    b) The SCG may take some time to set up and obtain a clear picture of unfolding events. As a first priority it should formulate a strategy with key objectives that will encompass and provide focus for all of the activity of the responding organisations. To ensure that co-ordinated effort is enabled, even before the SCG first meets, a working strategy should be immediately available to promote priority actions. When the SCG meets and gains a full understanding of the situation, they should then review and amend the working strategy and adjust objectives and priorities as necessary.

    c) A working strategy that should be used as the default initial start point is provided overleaf, together with initial objectives and enabling actions for further consideration.

    d) The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. The location, at which the SCG meets, with its supporting staff in place, is referred to as the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. This will usually, but not always be at the headquarters of the lead service or organisation (e.g. Police Headquarters). The

1239		location of meetings may change when another agency takes the lead for the
1240		Recovery Co-ordination Group when the focus moves from response to recovery.
1241		

1242   3. SCG strategy and meeting agenda

1243   3.1 The purpose of the SCG strategy is to direct and enable the response to an incident
1244   in order to save lives, to contain the situation and limit the effect of both the direct and
1245   indirect consequences created by the emergency and any unintended or indirect
1246   consequences caused by responder activity. Noting that the SCG will take some time
1247   to come together, the following considerations will assist those involved to determine
1248   the desired end state, aim, objectives, enablers and required activities that will be
1249   elaborated into a specific strategy when the SCG meets.

1250   3.2 Guiding objectives

1251   a) Protect and preserve life;
1252   b) Contain the incident: mitigate and minimise the impacts of the incident; maintain
1253   critical infrastructure and essential services;
1254   c) Create the conditions for recovery: promote restoration and improvement activity
1255   in the aftermath of an incident.

1256   3.3 Enabling activity

1257   a) The following activities will need to be in place to promote an effective response:
1258   b) The creation and sharing of a Common Operating Picture informed by and relevant
1259   to all of the responding organisations;
1260   c) Simplified procedures for making joint decisions and issue of timely direction;
1261   d) Prioritisation of tasks;
1262   e) Allocation of finite resources;
1263   f) Cross boundary co-operation between partners.

1264   3.4 Functional activities

1265   a) The governing objectives above are designed to encompass but not prioritise (that
1266   is the function of commanders at every level) the following list of activities:
1267   b) Saving and preserving human life;
1268   c) Relieving suffering;
1269   d) Containing the emergency, limiting its escalation and spread;
1270   e) Providing the public and businesses with warnings, information and advice;
1271   f) Protecting the health and safety of responding personnel;
1272   g) Safeguarding the environment;
1273   h) As far as is reasonably practicable protecting property;
1274   i) Maintaining or restoring critical activities;
1275   j) Maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;
1276   k) Promoting and facilitating self-help within the community;
1277   l) Facilitating investigations and inquiries (by scene preservation, record keeping);
1278   m) Facilitating the recovery of the community (including humanitarian assistance,
1279   economic infrastructure and environmental impacts);
1280   n) Evaluating the response and recovery effort;
1281   o) Identifying and taking action to implement lessons learnt;

1282   p) Upholding the rule of law.

1283 **Annex F.   SCG Meeting - Standing Agenda**

1284 Preliminaries: Pre notified seating plan by organisation & name plates for attendees in place

	Item Lead
Introductions (by exception and only where deemed necessary)	Chair
Declaration of items for urgent attention	Chair
Confirmation of decisions on urgent items	Chair
Adjourn as Necessary to Action Urgent Issues	
Situational briefing (including any clarifications or recent updates from Chief of Staff/ Information Manager/Attendees by exception only	
Review and agree strategy and priorities	Chair
Review outstanding actions and their effect	Chair
Determine new strategic actions required	Chair
Allocate responsibility for agreed actions	Chair
Confirm date and time of next meeting and required attendees (alongside an established meeting rhythm)	Chair
Post Meeting: Distribute record of decisions, ensure decision log is updated & complete	Sec/Chair

1285

1286 **Annex G.   Best Practice When Making Entries in a Decision Making Log**

1287   1. Your log should be **CIA** – **C**lear, **I**ntelligible, **A**ccurate

1288   2. Write in permanent black ink

1289   3. The log should be kept contemporaneously throughout, but if this is not practicable in
1290   the circumstances, entries should be made at the first reasonable opportunity after the
1291   event to which they relate, and if there is a delay of more than a few minutes in making
1292   an entry a short explanation of the reason for the delay should be included

1293   4. Ensure that you record the reasons for all actions taken and decisions made along with
1294   the actions and decisions themselves. The rationale may well turn out to be as
1295   important as the conclusion in justifying matters at a later date

1296   5. Record any non-verbal communications, you *must not* put your own interpretation on
1297   non-verbal communications Only note down facts. Record all questions and answers
1298   in direct speech

1299   6. No erasures, Mistakes should be ruled through with a single line and initialled

1300   7. No overwriting or writing above the ruled through error should be made

1301   8. No blank spaces

1302   9. Unused spaces at the end of lines should be ruled out with a single line

1303   10. Unused space at the end of a page should be ruled through with a diagonal line and
1304   initialled by the post holder date and timed

1305

1306 **Annex H.   Joint Decision Log Template**

Classification when complete				
	Print Name	**Signature**	**Time**	**Date**
Name of the Person completing this log				
Date and Time commenced				
Incident numbers				
Location of Incident				
Incident/event				

1307

1308 **1. Please enter the names, roles and organisation of all those commanders who have**
1309 **entries made in this log. They must sign their own signature, adding the date and time.**

Print name	Role	Organisation	Signature	Initial	Time	Date

1310

Decision Log Number	Date and Time of Decision
1. Identify situation & gather information What is your understanding of What has happened? What do we know so far? What might happen?	
2. Assess threats & risks (Do I need to take action immediately? Do I need to seek more information? Where can I get it from? What could go wrong?	
3. Policies & Procedure Which ones have I taken into account	
4. Options & Considerations What options are open to me? Consider immediacy of any risk/threat, limits of information etc.?	

5. Decision & Rationale
Decision controls- why are we doing this?
What do we think will happen?
Do we have a common understanding and position on;
   • Situation
   • Available information
   • Terminology
   • Working practices
   • Conclusions
Is the benefit proportional to the risk?	

6. Review of Decision - Time and result	
Names of People Making Decision	
Name of Person Recording Decision	

1311

1312 **Annex I.   IIMARCH: A Common Briefing Tool**

1313   IIMARCH is a structured format for delivering briefings, orders and de-briefing.

Initial	Item	Action
I.	**Information** ***Key questions:*** What, where, when, how, how many, so what, what might? ***Considerations:*** timeline and history (if applicable), key facts reported using M/ETHANE (**M**ajor Incident [if applicable], **E**xact Location, **T**ype of Incident, **H**azards, **A**ccess, **N**umber of casualties, **E**mergency services)	
I.	**Intent** ***Key questions:*** why are we here, what are we trying to achieve? ***Considerations:*** strategic aim and objectives, joint strategy	
M.	**Method** ***Key questions:*** how are we going to do it? ***Considerations:*** command, control and coordination arrangements, tactical and operational policy and plans, contingency plans	
A.	**Administration** ***Key questions:*** what is required for effective, efficient and safe implementation? ***Considerations:*** identification of commanders, tasking, timing, decision logs, equipment, dress code, PPE, welfare, food, logistics	
R.	**Risk Assessment** ***Key questions:*** what are the relevant risks, and what measures are required to mitigate them? ***Considerations:*** to reflect the JESIP common understanding of risk element, and using the	

Initial	Item	Action
	ERICPD [32] hierarchy for risk control as appropriate.	
C.	**Communications** ***Key questions:*** how are we going to initiate and maintain communications with all partners and interested parties? ***Considerations:*** radio call signs, other means of communication, understanding of interagency communications, information assessment, media handling and joint media strategy	
H.	**Humanitarian issues** ***Key questions:*** what humanitarian assistance and human rights considerations arise or may arise from this event and the response to it? ***Considerations:*** requirement for humanitarian assistance, information sharing and disclosure, potential impacts on individuals' human rights	

1314

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[32] ERICPD: **E**liminate, **R**educe, **I**solate, **C**ontrol, **P**ersonal Protective Equipment, **D**iscipline.

Annex J.   Definition of Key Terms in Interoperability

Aim - a short, precise and measurable statement of the desired end state which an effort or activity is intended to bring about.

Capability - A demonstrable ability to respond to and recover from a particular threat or hazard.

Command - The exercise of vested authority, that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives. Command is carried out by those who have been given authority (through role or rank) over others, for a specific operation or incident, to make decisions and give direction in order to achieve jointly defined and agreed objectives. Personnel who provide subject matter expertise or advice do so in support of the Operations or Tactical Commander and as part of the Command Support Team.

Commander - Personnel who, by function or rank, are charged with ensuring the readiness of their teams, forces or organisations to discharge their stated duties and obligations.

Control - The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives. Control is defined as the authority and capability of an organisation to direct the actions of its own personnel. While one emergency service cannot exercise command over another, it may be appropriate for service commanders to grant the authority to exercise control of their organisation's personnel or assets to a co-ordinating group or commander of the designated lead service for a specific task.

Co-ordination - The integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. Co-ordination occurs at one or more of three ascending levels - Operational, Tactical and Strategic, with national level co-ordination in the most serious of emergencies.

Emergency - An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.

Guiding responsibility – Where control of an individual, as defined in Annex A, is transferred to another emergency service for the purposes of a specific task. Legal liability for the actions of the said individual remains, at all times, with the service of which the individual is an employee.

Joint learning - The identification of lessons from exercises or operations that are relevant to joint working and the process of effecting and embedding change in organisations and behaviours in response to those lessons. Learning is the process of developing knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours. It is therefore essential that lessons identified about joint working, from event or exercise debriefs or other mechanisms, should be captured, assessed, shared and acted upon jointly in order to promote continuous improvement but also to confirm good practice where it is identified.

Joint working - A number of organisations working together on a course, or courses of action, to achieve agreed emergency response objectives. The public expects that the emergency services will work together, particularly in the initial response emergency, in order to preserve life and reduce harm. Individual Police, Fire & Rescue or Ambulance Service priorities should

1356 not override the degree of multi-agency co-operation required to efficiently and effectively work
1357 together. The aim is to use the available resources to the best collective effect to achieve the
1358 jointly agreed Objectives for a successful response. It is essential that the activities of one
1359 responder service do not impede or detract from the efficiency of another.

1360 **Means** - the resources and capabilities that are available to realise defined objectives.

1361 **Objectives** - a list of steps, phases or tasks that have to be completed in order to achieve the
1362 overarching aim.

1363 **Personal Data** - Data which relates to a living individual or group who can be identified from
1364 the data and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indications of
1365 intentions in respect of the individual (The Data Protection Act 1998).

1366 **Plan** - a statement or elaboration of what an individual, organisation or group will do in the
1367 event of specified circumstances.

1368 **Policy** - a statement of factors that bear on ways and means by which strategic objectives can
1369 be achieved.

1370 **Rapid onset emergency** – An emergency which develops quickly and usually with immediate
1371 effects, thereby limiting the time available to consider response options.

1372 **Rising tide emergency** – An event or situation with a lead-in time of days, weeks or even
1373 months e.g. health pandemic, flooding or pop concert, the final impact of which may not be
1374 apparent early on.

1375 **Sensitive personal Data** - Personal data consisting of information as to (including but not
1376 exclusively): race/ ethnic origin, religious beliefs, physical or mental health and commission or
1377 alleged commission of any offence (The Data Protection Act 1998).

1378 **Strategy** - A high level statement of the desired end state and the ways and means of
1379 achieving it.

1380 **Task** – a defined piece of work, typically of limited time duration, that is allocated to a specific
1381 individual or group.

1382 **Ways** - the articulation of relevant options and constraints that apply to the attainment of
1383 defined objectives.