JESIP

Joint Emergency Service Interoperability – Consolidated Command Trainer Guide

Version 1 (February 2017)

JESIP
Working Together – Saving Lives

This training product has been developed by the College of Policing in collaboration with the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and Chief Fire Officers Association on behalf of the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) team and the national Interoperability Board.

The College acknowledges and thanks all those who contributed in the development of this training product and is committed to working collaboratively in the future to develop, deliver and maintain it.

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The College is committed to the promotion of equal opportunities. Every effort has been made throughout this text to avoid exclusionary language or stereotypical terms. Occasionally, to ensure clarity, it has been necessary to refer to an individual by gender.

Contents

Purpose of this trainer guide

This guide has been designed to assist trainers in the delivery of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command programme. It can be used to support the initial training of commanders and also to support the continuing professional development of commanders. As a trainer it is important that you read through this trainer guide **in full** prior to delivery of any learning associated with the programme. The guide provides you with an introduction to the overall scope and design of the programme, as well as session plans for the delivery of individual sessions and the use of accompanying learning resources. This guide should be read in conjunction with the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine **the Interoperability Framework Edition 2 unless otherwise stated the source of the material is the JESIP Doctrine. The Doctrine is subject to copyright © – Crown copyright 2013 (Cabinet Office).**

Introduction to the module

The learning programme meets the requirement under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 for the carrying out of exercises and training of appropriate Category 1 staff who have a role in dealing with major incidents at an Operational Tactical level, and includes operational and tactical coordination of activities with other organisations and initiatives.

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Commanders need to be able to understand, analyse, and respond to information in constantly changing events. Accordingly, the learning programme aims to provide delegates with the knowledge and understanding to work together effectively at the Operational and Tactical levels of command, in response to all incidents including major or complex incidents and fast moving terrorist scenarios.

Therefore, as part of the classroom-based training, learners will be required to consolidate their learning by dealing with a major incident scenario as the Operational or Tactical Commander representing their blue light service, to ensure the timely resolution of the major incident/civil emergency.

Audience

The learning programme is aimed at officers, staff and volunteers from Category 1 and Category 2 responder agencies who perform the role of operational or tactical commanders.

The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training Operational and Tactical Command Curriculum

The national curriculum for Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command has been commissioned by the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles (JESIP) team on behalf of the national Interoperability Board and developed in partnership with the College of Policing, Chief Fire Officers Association, the National Ambulance Resilience Unit and other relevant stakeholders.

This learning programme therefore functions as the agreed national standard which meets the training needs of delegates from the police, fire and rescue and ambulance services and other responder agencies, for Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command.

The learning programme employs a variety of learning tools and approaches, including self-directed learning, classroom-based learning and scenario-based training. The programme is structured as follows:

Phase One: Prior learning

The aim of this phase is to provide an opportunity to benchmark and monitor the level of prior knowledge and experience achieved by learners before their attendance at the classroom phase. The prior learning phase is primarily knowledge-based. In this regard learners are required to:

Read the pre-read for this course.

Read the pre-read for this course. Phase Two: Classroom-based delivery

This phase builds on the knowledge-based learning completed during Phase 1. Classroom delivery is designed to be dynamic, maximising opportunities for interaction between the learners, thereby enhancing the major incident joint learning experience. As implied previously, the principal aim of this phase of the training is to encourage the learners' thinking with regard to working together effectively, with other responders, at an incident. JESIP can be used at any incident, but the training focuses on major incidents. Accordingly, the programme is designed in the same operationally-focused manner. The learner will be taken through the role and responsibilities of their role in a major incident environment and then the operational tactical considerations of their role around the Joint Decision Model (JDM). The course closes with a developmental scenario aimed at their specific role in a major incident.

Key areas of learning

The classroom-based training as set out below is focussed around a key sequence of learning, as follows:

- Review of existing knowledge/experience

- Understanding the role of the Operational Commander
- Understanding the role of the Tactical Commander
- Explanation of the Joint Decision Model
- Shared Situational Awareness
- Interoperability communication
- Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Principles
- Consolidation of learning

These areas of learning have been translated into the learning sessions outlined in this trainer guide. You will find that each session plan below sets out aims, objectives, detailed content and the methodology for delivery. The session plans also point to the additional learning materials and resources required to support the delivery of each individual session.

No 'single-service' models, definitions or terminology should be used in the delivery of this learning, and the methodology and content of the lessons, as presented, should be followed.

Reference materials

In addition, trainers are advised to familiarise themselves with the following materials:

- Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Edition 2
- Cabinet Office Lexicon 2013 v2.1.1
- Cabinet Office (2012) Civil Protection Common Map Symbology
- Cabinet Office (2005) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (revised)
- Cabinet Office (2013) Emergency Response and Recovery V5

Indicative timetable

0900hrs-0920hrs	0920hrs-1020hrs	1020hrs-1040hrs	1040hrs-1140hrs	1140hrs-1230hrs	1230hrs-1300hrs	1300hrs-1400hrs	1400hrs-1430hrs	1430hrs-14500hrs	14500hrs-1530hrs	1530hrs-1550hrs	1540hrs-1710hrs
Introduction to Course Aims and Objectives	The Role of Tactical Command	Break	Information and Intelligence	Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy	Lunch	Powers, Policies and Procedures	Options and Contingencies	Break	Action and Review	Airwave	Consolidation Exercise and Closure

Scheme of work

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Course Introduction	20 mins	• Recognise and be familiar with members of the training team and fellow programme delegates • Explain the aim of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Operational and Tactical Command programme • Introduce the JESIP Doctrine	Presentation Discussion	• Introduction of trainers and delegates • Aim of the programme	• PowerPoint • Course contact list
Role of Tactical Commander	60 mins	• Recognise the need for interoperability at a major incident • Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a major incident • Explain the role of an Operational Commander in a major incident • Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) • Recognise the wider multi-agency response • Describe the purpose and function of the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG)	Presentation Discussion Group Work	• The need for interoperability • Understanding the roles and responsibilities as developed all blue light services and wider responders • The role of an LRF • The wider multi-agency response • Establishing what a TCG is	• PowerPoint • Task sheet • Trainers Specimen Answers task sheet • Handout

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Information and Intelligence	50 mins	• To introduce the importance of the emergency services working together and sharing intelligence • Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model • Explain the overarching or primary aim and the five stages of the Joint Decision Model • Define M/ETHANE and recognise the importance of it for passing information • Identify the need to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform • Recognise the importance of social media at a major incident • Recognise the advantages and disadvantages of using social media in response to a major incident	Presentation Discussion	• Understanding and using M/ETHANE • The components of the JDM including the overriding ethic • The considerations required for the Information and Intelligence stage of the JDM • The need for common terminology and the use of the Cabinet Office Lexicon • How and why social media is relevant to all commanders working in a multi-agency setting	• PowerPoint

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy	60 mins	• Identify how to jointly assess risk and develop a working strategy in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Explain the key steps to delivering an effective integrated emergency operational planned response • Explain and demonstrate the application of the joint assessment of risk within a given major incident scenario	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for Assess Risk and Develop a Working Strategy stage of the JDM • Key steps • The application of the joint risk assessment	• PowerPoint • Scenario task sheet
Powers, Policies and Procedures	60 mins	• Identify what generic powers, policies and procedures need to be considered in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Recognise the need for accountability and the necessity of keeping an accurate audit trail of decisions made • Recognise the generic powers, policies and procedures within a given major incident scenario	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Powers, Policies and Procedures stage of the JDM • The importance of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for all commanders • The importance of the audit trail	• PowerPoint • Fire and Police 'Striking the Balance' document (if required) • Scenario task sheet

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Options and Contingencies	40 mins	• Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Identify the principles of joint working • Describe the options for communications at a major incident	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Option and Contingencies stage of the JDM • Principles of Joint Working • Interoperability communication options	• PowerPoint • Social Media handout
Action and Review	40 mins	• Identify how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model • Recognise the importance of a post-event debrief • Explain the need for joint learning in order to sustain interoperability	Presentation Discussion	• The considerations required for the Action and Review stage of the JDM • The need for joint learning • The importance of a debrief	• PowerPoint

Session	Time	Objectives	Methodology	Key issues	Resources
Consolidation Exercise	80 mins	• Identify the need to declare a major incident in a given scenario • Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a given major incident scenario • Discuss the underpinning rationale in a tactical plan evidenced around the Joint Decision Model for a given scenario	Presentation Discussion Group Work	• If a major incident should be declared and by who • Evidenced answers around the JDM • Interoperability communication	• Handout • Task sheet • Consolidation Exercise task answer sheet • Trainers Specimen answers task sheet
Course Closure	10 mins	• Provide the delegates with the opportunity to ask questions, clarifying any ambiguities • Identify new learning that the delegates can apply to working effectively as a Tactical Commander at a major incident	Discussion	• Clarifying any issues and answering any outstanding questions	N/A

Sessions

Session 1.1: Programme introduction

Duration

20 minutes

Aim

To introduce delegates to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Services Training – Operational and Tactical Command.

Objectives

By the end of this learning programme the delegates will be able to:

- Recognise and be familiar with members of the training team and fellow programme delegates
- Explain the aim of the major incident tactical command programme
- Demonstrate awareness of the JESIP Doctrine

Resources

- Programme Introduction PowerPoint
- Course contact list
- Computer
- Smart board/whiteboard
- Pens

Delivery method

The trainer should now ask the delegates to form groups so there is at least one member of each of the tri-services in each group. They should stay in their tri-service groups throughout the working day. This will assist in the joint multi-agency theme of the learning.

Ice breaker

Introductions and ice-breaking exercise – no more than 2 minutes per delegate.

All persons in the room will introduce themselves, starting with the trainer(s).

State the following:

- Name
- Current role
- Operational or Tactical Command Major Incident experience

The trainer should link these introductions back to the information the delegates have been asked to provide in the Delegate Research Portfolio, in relation to their experience and their requirements from the programme.

Programme aim

The trainer(s) will explain the purpose of the programme, which is as follows:

The programme aim is to provide delegates with the knowledge and understanding to work together effectively at the Tactical level of command, in response to major or complex incidents.

Background notes for JESIP Doctrine

The Trainer should explain that the JESIP Doctrine originally focused on the interoperability of the three emergency services but is now being rolled out to all Category 1 and 2 responders and partner organisations. Doctrine sets out the way responders should train and operate and is built upon a common backbone which defines terminology, principles and ways of working. Joint doctrine sets out what responders should do and how they should do it in a multi-agency working environment, in order to achieve the degree of interoperability that is essential to successful joint response. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to guide, explain and inform.

This Doctrine provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on what actions they should undertake when responding to major and complex incidents, and the principles are equally relevant to day-to-day joint operations. The guidance contained within this publication should be reflected consistently within individual organisations' guidance, instructions to their personnel and in training. Separate publications set out specialist ways of working that will apply in specific circumstances such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) incidents or Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks (MTFA). These specialist response documents should also reflect the generic guidance contained within this publication.

The trainer should now briefly explain the **programme timetable**.

The trainers should then give out the **course contact list** and ask the delegates to provide their contact details for the group. Once completed the trainer should ensure that each delegate receives a copy of the contact list before the end of the day, this will assist in the interoperability communication process post course.

Closure

Trainer(s) to answer any questions and clarify any points raised by the delegates. Trainer(s) to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.2: The role of the operational and tactical commander

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to roles, responsibilities and command structures when carrying out the role of the Operational or Tactical Commander during a given incident.

Objectives

- Recognise the need for interoperability at a major incident
- Explain the role of a Tactical Commander in a major incident
- Describe the purpose and function of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF)
- Recognise the wider multi-agency response
- Describe the purpose and function of the Tactical Coordination Group (TCG)

Resources

- Role of Tactical and Operational Commander PowerPoint
- Role of Tactical Operational task sheet
- Roles and Responsibilities of the Operational Commander handout
- Role of Tactical Commander task sheet
- Roles and Responsibilities of the Tactical Commander handout

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

It is important that an individual taking on the role of Operational or Tactical Commander is fully conversant with the role and responsibilities involved. This session explores how the delegates, as an Operational or Tactical Commander (for their own agencies) in a joint interoperability setting, work together in a major incident.

This session will seek to identify the level of knowledge of individual delegates from the different participating organisations, as they commence the programme. Accordingly, this initial session is designed to explore the question: 'Where are the delegates now in terms of their knowledge and experience?' This will enable the trainers to evaluate the level of the experience and knowledge in the room, and identify what areas should be focused upon, in order to maximise the learning experience for each delegate.

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for public inquiries

The trainer should explain the above was written by Lord Justice Taylor in the Inquiry he conducted into the Hillsborough Disaster April 1989.

An essential element of resilience is learning from crisis. A learning organisation will ensure that lessons learned will result in changes to the organisational culture, norms and operating practices.

The consistency with which the same or similar issues have been raised by each of the past public inquiries is a cause for concern. It suggests that lessons identified from the events are not being learned, to the extent that there is a sufficient change in both policy and practice to prevent their repetition.

Background notes for the need for interoperability

The trainer should explain that the requirement for joint response is not new to the emergency services and should already be in place for routine, day-to-day working because the principles of interoperability contained within the JESIP Doctrine are already established.

However, the findings of public inquiries and inquests in recent years, and the lessons identified, have highlighted where responders could have worked better together, showing much greater levels of cooperation and coordination.

There is an inescapable requirement for better coordination and cooperation between the three emergency services, and, by extension, to the wider partnership of responder organisations, for both routine and emergency response operations. Interoperability is defined as the extent to which organisations can work together coherently as a matter of routine. To ensure interoperability exists between the emergency services in England, Wales and Scotland, which might involve cross-border mutual aid at any time, all responder organisations must make certain that their single service response arrangements, and local procedures, are in alignment with this joint doctrine, in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

Group work

The trainer should then hand out the **Role of Tactical Commander Task Sheet** to the delegates for completion in their multi-agency groups; each group has the same questions. They should have 15 minutes to carry out this task.

After 15 minutes, the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the plenary group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should give out the **Role of Tactical Commander Handout** and discuss the profile with the delegates.

The trainer should then hand out the **Role of an Operational Commander Task Sheet** to the delegates for completion in their multi-agency groups; each group has the same questions. They should have 15 minutes to carry out this task.

After 15 minutes, the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the plenary group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should give out the **Role of an Operational Commander Handout** and discuss the profile with the delegates.

Note: The trainer should explain to the group that the role and responsibilities have been formulated from the tri-service command and control doctrine, the relevant National Occupational Standards and wider consultation from the Cabinet Office, JESIP and the tri-services.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet. A different team should present first for each question.

Background notes for major incidents

The trainer should explain that whilst JESIP should be applied at all incidents where more than one agency is involved it is particularly important at major incidents.

The trainer should explain that the Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework Edition 2 provides a new definition for major incidents and all responder agencies should adopt this definition.

Background notes for the purpose of the local resilience forum (LRF)

The trainer should explain that Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 together with supporting regulations and statutory guidance HM Government: Emergency Preparedness (2012) establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each.

In England and Wales there is an LRF for each Police Force area.
LRF members have a collective responsibility to plan and prepare for emergencies and communicate with their communities about the risk of emergencies. This responsibility is set out in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated Cabinet Office guidance.

LRFs exist to enable an effective and efficient multi-agency response. It is the appropriate forum to ensure that the conditions for wider emergency responder interoperability are understood, acted on and validated.

Source: Cabinet Office (2013): The Role of Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document

Background notes for deliverables of local resilience forum

The trainers should explain that the LRF conduct a systematic, planned and coordinated approach to encourage Category 1 responders, according to their functions, to address all aspects of policy in relation to:

- risk and hazard
- planning for emergencies
- planning for business continuity management
- publishing information about risk assessments and plans
- arrangements to warn and inform the public
- training and exercises
- other aspects of the civil protection duty, including the promotion of business continuity management by local authorities

Source: Cabinet Office (2013): The Role of the Local Resilience Forums: A Reference Document

Background notes for responder agencies

The trainer should explain that interoperability between emergency responders is not limited to the emergency services, and any major incident response may require support from the wider partnership of Category one and two responders.

Non-blue light response organisations will usually take much longer to mobilise than the emergency services and therefore require the emergency services to provide:

- Notification of a major incident declaration at the earliest opportunity
- Notification should include relevant information to enable an appropriate response (shared situational awareness).

Cat 1 and Cat 2 examples

The trainer may wish to add the badges, crests or logos from local category 1 and category 2 responders to these slides.

The trainer should describe category 1 and category 2 responders. The trainer should refer to local category 1 and 2 responders such as the local ambulance trust, local police forces, fire brigades and local authorities as well as others such as local rail operation companies and other pertinent local responders. The trainer should point out that category 2 responders are not obliged to plan for incidents under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

The trainer should describe how UK armed forces are neither a category 1 or category 2 responder but may have a role to play in dealing with a major incident.

The trainer should describe that many voluntary agencies have roles to play in responding to major incidents but are not category 1 or 2 responders.

Background notes for tiers of command (13) from first module

The trainer should explain that the emergency services have a common three tier command structure. They should define the roles of the strategic, tactical and operational tiers of command.

The trainer should explain that historically these tiers were labelled as gold, silver and bronze and that, whilst many organisations continue to use these labels, locally students should use the national labels.

Background notes for tabards (1r) from first module

The trainer should explain how police fire and ambulance commanders at the scene should wear a tabard to assist in identification and so aid commanders in co-locating at the scene.

The trainer should explain that many other category 1 and category 2 responders may provide their commanders with tabards.

Background notes for the purpose of the tactical coordinating group (TCG)

The trainer should explain that this group should be formed as soon as is practicable in order to determine a coordinated response at the tactical level. The TCG should meet at an agreed location, either near the scene at the Forward Command Point (FCP) or another appropriate location designated as the Tactical Control.

The TCG should meet as frequently as required by the circumstances of the incident. All key decisions should be recorded in writing for audit purposes. A standard agenda can be used, focused on tactical issues.

Background notes for functions of the TCG

The trainer should explain that multi-agency commanders at the Tactical Level will have specific and differing organisational responsibilities and priorities.

However, collaboratively, they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and coordination required to deliver successful outcomes in order to meet the strategic requirements as directed by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise. Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.3: Information and intelligence

Duration

50 minutes

Aim

To develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to Information and Intelligence when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- To introduce the importance of the emergency services working together and sharing intelligence
- Describe the structure of the Joint Decision Model
- Explain the overarching or primary aim and the five stages of the Joint Decision Model
- Define M/ETHANE and recognise the importance of it for passing information
- Identify the need to provide timely and accurate information to warn and inform
- Recognise the importance of social media at a major incident

Resources

- Intelligence and Information Tactical Commander PowerPoint
- Social Media handout

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for The Pitt Review

The trainer should explain that the Pitt Review states that the emergency services must be willing to work together and share information. The following quote should be shared with the group:

"We recognise there are issues of commercial confidentiality and security, but we firmly believe that the public interest is best served by closer cooperation and a presumption that information will be shared. We must be open, honest and direct about risk, including with the public. We must move from a culture of 'need to know' to one of 'need to share'."

Warnings are issued when severe weather and flooding are judged by the experts to reach certain levels of likelihood.

Ideally, warning content and methods of communication should be such that all members of the community receive the warning and understand the action they should take, informed by awareness before the emergency.

The Pitt Review would welcome "a common approach being considered further by both Local and Regional Resilience Forums. It is clear that the local authority lead role in the recovery phase should extend to an overview of communications, ensuring clear, consistent messages across all partnership organisations."

Source: Cabinet Office (2007): Learning lessons from the 2007 floods (Executive Summary) Pitt Report

The trainer should then communicate the following:

Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, this information sharing duty is not a statutory obligation to breach the common law duty of confidentiality – where the information is confidential the party considering making the disclosure must consider whether the interests of the individual or individuals will be better served by making the disclosure. This means it is not a 'mandatory gateway' that imposes an absolute legal obligation on public bodies to provide relevant information to one another. Rather the party should confirm that a legitimising condition of the Data Protection Act 1998 is met, and that there would not be a breach of the common law duty of confidence in sharing the data.

Source: HM Government 2007 Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders pg.17

Background notes for Joint Decision Model

The trainer should explain that a wide range of decision-making models exist, including specific models used by the individual emergency services. Such models exist to practically support decision makers working under difficult circumstances, and a guiding principle is that they should not be over-complicated. One of the difficulties facing commanders from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective decisions together. The **J**oint **D**ecision **M**odel (JDM) has been developed to enable this.

One of the guiding principles of the JDM is that decision makers will use their judgement and experience in deciding what additional questions to ask, and considerations to take into account, to reach a jointly agreed decision. They must therefore be free to interpret the JDM for themselves, reasonably and according to the circumstances facing them at any given time. Strict adherence to the stepped process outlined in the JDM should always be secondary to achieving desired outcomes, particularly in time-sensitive situations.

Background notes for decision controls

The trainer should explain how decision controls provide commanders with a structured way to consider factors that may influence their decision making.

The trainer should explain that the decision controls are not a core JESIP product, unlike the JDM, but are offered as a way of improving the robustness of decision making.

The trainer should explain that the decision controls are a series of questions commanders should ask themselves as they apply the JDM.

The trainer should explain that this is only a brief introduction into the use of decision controls.

Background notes for overarching or primary aim

The trainer should explain to the delegates joint decisions must be made with reference to the overarching or primary aims of any response to an emergency. This is to save lives and reduce harm. This is achieved through the means of a coordinated, multi-agency response. Decision makers should have this uppermost in their minds throughout the decision making process.

The JDM can be used for a **rapid onset** or a **rising tide** emergency[1] as it enables the establishment of shared situational awareness.

Background notes for stage one: information

The trainer should explain that situational awareness is having appropriate answers to the following questions: what is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it?

In the context of the **Joint** Decision Model, **shared** situational awareness becomes critically important. Shared situational awareness is achieved by **sharing** information and understanding between the involved organisations to build a stronger, multi-dimensional understanding of events, their implications, associated risks and potential outcomes.

Commanders cannot assume other emergency service personnel see things or say things in the same way, and a sustained effort is required to reach a common view and understanding of events, risks and their implications.

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[1] The definition of rapid onset and rising tide can be found in The Lexicon and The Delegate Research Portfolio

Background notes on M/ETHANE

The trainer should explain that the following mnemonic should be used when passing information between emergency responders and control rooms to enable the establishment of shared situational awareness:

- **M**ajor incident declared?
- **E**xact location
- **T**ype of incident
- **H**azards present or suspected
- **A**ccess – routes that are safe to use
- **N**umber, type, severity of casualties
- **E**mergency services present and those required.

The trainer should describe how this message format can be used for all incidents and not just major incidents. Students should be told that at incidents that are not major incidents an ETHANE message should be sent.

Group work

M/ETHANE

Background notes for METHANE

The trainer should explain to the delegates that a plane has overshot a runway at Chesterton Airport, colliding with a goods train in the yard opposite. This has caused a derailment of the train and some chemical containers have fallen from the carriage on to the track and split open.

The plane was carrying 237 passengers and 9 crew. The yard is a goods yard and there are 3 workmen unaccounted for. The chemicals are currently unknown.

The trainer should ask the delegates to construct a M/ETHANE message in their groups in relation to the information and picture provided.

They have 10 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 10 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The M/ETHANE message should be similar to the one below.

M/ETHANE

Major Incident declared or Standby	Major Incident Declared
Exact location	Westshire Railway Yard, at the North End of Runway 20, Chesterton Airport
Type of incident	A passenger aircraft has overshot the runway and broken up and come to rest in the Westshire freight yard. It has also collided with a freight train which has derailed losing some of its cargo which is as yet unidentified chemicals. Collision between a passenger aircraft and freight train, persons reported.
Hazards	There is debris from the plane, jet fuel, smoke but no evidence of fire. There are 2 x 1000l containers of unknown chemicals and the train is currently derailed and it is potentially unstable. The goods yard ground is uneven with many trip and slip hazards and sharp objects scattered around. Unknown chemicals involved including aviation fuel, the train is derailed.
Access	The scene can be accessed through the long stay car park at the Northern end of Runway 20; this is directly adjacent to the runway and goods yard.
Number of casualties	There are approx. 250 casualties, mostly in the remaining part of plane fuselage. There is currently no information on the types of injuries.
Emergency services	Emergency services required are ambulances, HART, police, fire service.

Background notes for terminology

The trainer should explain that providing timely and accurate information to inform and protect communities is key to a joint interoperability working approach.

One of the barriers to achieving shared situational awareness is the use of terminology that either means different things to different people, or is simply not understood across different services. Defining commonly understood terminology is desirable, and to a large degree attainable, but emergency responders must always be attentive to the risk that their own understanding of concepts and specific terms is either not understood or is misunderstood by others.

Issues to consider are:

- The language and terminology (including scientific concepts) should be commonly understood
- The use of probabilistic language (e.g. likely, possible, and probable) should be commonly understood
- Acronyms and abbreviations should be recorded and commonly understood
- What other sources of ambiguity, miscommunication and confusion exist?
- The Cabinet Office Lexicon should be used as reference for all joint interoperability terminology. A link to the Lexicon can be found in the **Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook**.

Maps are widely used in emergency management, but if different organisations use different map symbols to denote the same feature (e.g. a Rendezvous point (RVP) or inner cordon) then there is scope for dangerous confusion, and the potential of the map as a tool to coordinate multi-agency operations is severely curtailed. For this reason, Cabinet Office and Ordnance Survey have collaborated in developing and disseminating a core set of **common map symbols** for use in emergency management.

These can be found online and there is a link to the download page on the OS website at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-common-map-symbols

Background notes for social media

The trainer should explain to the delegates that it's not **your** (the blue light services delegates') emergency anymore. Audiences want to play a role, but no longer want to be victims or witnesses……… they use social networks and mobile technology.

- Do not treat social media as something special or separate from normal work processes.
- Social media users try to do their part by forwarding information. Disaster information is one of the most highly forwarded or retweeted information in social media. Many users, who are often removed from the situation at hand, lend their support by forwarding information to ensure it reaches as wide an audience as possible.

- Social media can help monitor and address issues in disaster situations and recovery. The immediacy of social media makes it invaluable in the live monitoring of situations. Victims of natural disasters, frequently taken out of their comfort zones and regular modes of interaction with services, will often vent any frustrations through many outlets.
- Social Media is immediate and will allow organisations to proactively push out large volumes of information to large numbers of people, ensuring there is no vacuum of official information.
- Do not use social media solely to push out information. Use it to receive feedback and involve your online community.

Additional Background Notes for Trainers: An example of social media relevancy at a major incident:

Social Media was a major source for those seeking Boston Marathon bombing information. 56% of young adults kept up to date with Boston Marathon bombing news via social network sites such as Facebook. TV was the most widely used source of information, with 80% following the story there. Four in 10 kept up via radio reports and three in 10 read newspapers. A quarter of Americans got information about the devastating explosions and the hunt for the bombers on social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. There were 3.5 million tweets in the first 24hrs. After the explosion the Boston Police Department went from 40,000 followers to 300,000.

The Boston bombs exploded at 14.49hrs, at 14.50hrs the first tweet and picture was tweeted.

Cable News Network (CNN) and the Associated Press (AP) wrongly reported that the suspects were in custody, many others picked up on the news. WCVB-TV Boston, crediting the AP with the news, wrongly said that an arrest was 'imminent'. **This inaccurate message was re-tweeted 87 times.**

Reddit (social media site) had to apologise to the family of missing Brown University student Sunil Tripathi, who was misidentified on social media as a bombing suspect.

Background notes for social media in response

The trainer should explain to the delegates that before they use social media as an option to deal with the response to a major incident, they should consider the positives and negatives of its use. These are as follows:

Positives:

- It can provide access to immediate feedback and information from the public at scenes, empowering the blue light services.
- It provides situational awareness for Category 1 responders in disaster-affected locations who otherwise have no means of communication.

- "Myth busting" of misinformation and rumours in the media and community. Social media can quickly kill rumour and misreporting before it becomes "fact" in the mainstream media, mainly through the #mythbuster hashtag.
    - The Guardian Interactive team who were responsible for the analysis in 'Reading the Riots'[2] suggest that, in order to curtail the spread of unreliable information, there are three key points for consideration (aimed at individual Twitter users):
        - If you're going to retweet, check what you're retweeting.
        - If you're going to send out information and you don't know the provenance of the information, please say so. Just say that you don't know, say it's unconfirmed.
        - If you're in the possession of valuable information to debunk rumours, add a link so that other people can cascade this information and debunk rumours. (Analysis of 2.6 million tweets).

Negatives:

- In cases of large-scale crises or in cases of investigations that receive special attention by the public, blue light systems for communication with the public come under stress. Increased attention for the information of a service may exceed the geographic boundaries and can go way beyond the local community that the service is usually responsible for, as local news can be virally distributed through social media.
  Usually, the IT infrastructures behind blue light service websites are not able to cope with the peaks in demand. One successful way of dealing with the high demands has been the use of various social media sites that can better balance high loads in their global infrastructures.
- Don't assume that just because something is online, that everybody has seen it or understood it – don't just rely on social media, your communications plan must try to reach people using a number of different tools and tactics.
- Remember that sometimes the best way to help someone is offline, not online. Human contact is one of the best ways of helping someone. Take things offline where possible.
- Commanders must ensure that their responders are not contaminating information of the major incident e.g. taking photos of it and posting them on social media sites. **Be aware what your responders are doing at the scene.**

[2] Guardian Interactive team (2011) Reading the Riots: Investigating England's Summer of Disorder

Background notes for social media tactical plan considerations

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Consider one designated social media lead person per agency, directing and coordinating all aspects of the organisation's response, including managing the messages and the communities. For a better result, there also should be one designated social media monitoring person who actually interacts with fans and followers, responding to comments, twitter mentions and other enquirers.
- Emergency and Disaster Communications Team – Key staff should convene to strategically review the situation and manage the communications surrounding the issue. Daily meetings with the social media lead people from all organisations/agencies are necessary, so you can coordinate the social media efforts. **This means a joint response with a joint multi-agency generic message.**
- It's very important that you designate a time and frequency of distribution of generic message to the general media and the general public.
- Consider creating a media centre in your website containing embedded banners, blog posts, press releases, photography and video of the major incident ready to be shared by the media or bloggers.
- Consider live Tweeting key points as they are made in your briefings.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.4: Assess risk and develop a working strategy for operational and tactical command

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to jointly assessing risk and developing a working strategy when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify how to jointly assess risk and develop a working strategy in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Explain the key steps to delivering an effective integrated emergency operational planned response
- Explain and demonstrate the application of the joint assessment of risk within a given major incident scenario.

Resources

- Risk PowerPoint
- Risk scenario task sheet

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should also bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for ICL Factory Explosion Inquiry Report 2009

The trainer should explain that the above is part of an extract from Lord Gill's Inquiry report into the explosion, caused by a leak of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) on 11 May 2004, when nine people died and many more were injured at the ICL Plastics factory in Maryhill, Glasgow.

The quote emphasises the need to share insight and knowledge into the changing circumstance of an incident with everyone involved. In this instance, the site owner didn't share and (wasn't asked for) information updates. As a result, this had an impact on the on-scene management overall situational awareness.

LPG, which had leaked from an on-site underground metal pipe into the basement of the factory ignited, causing an explosion, which led to the catastrophic collapse of the four storey Victorian factory.

The factory manufactured plastics products and coatings and employed a number of people at the time of the explosion. On 28 August 2007, two companies (ICL Tech Limited and ICL Plastics Ltd) were fined £200,000 each at the High Court in Glasgow, following guilty pleas; ICL Plastics Limited for breaches of Sections 2 and 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and ICL Technical Plastics Limited for breaches of Sections 2 and 3 of that Act.

Background notes for stage two

The trainer should explain that emphasis should be placed upon the importance of the first 60 minutes of response to a major incident, during which responder intervention is recognised to have the greatest impact on saving life.

Understanding risk is central to emergency response, and one of the major challenges in joint emergency response is for commanders to build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks, and the way that those risks may be increased, or controlled by decisions made and actions taken by the emergency responders.

In a major or complex emergency the different emergency services will have unique insights into those risks, and by **sharing** that knowledge a common understanding of the various risks can be established, considered in the context of the agreed priorities and can inform a jointly agreed working strategy to resolve the incident.

Background notes for developing a working strategy

The trainer should explain that it is rare for a complete or perfect picture to exist and therefore a working strategy, for a rapid onset emergency, should be based on the information available at the time. The points on the slide should be taken into account when developing a working strategy.

Background notes for key steps

The trainer should explain that a joint assessment of the prevailing risks limits the likelihood of any service following a course of action in which the other services are unable to participate. This, therefore, increases the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the response as well as increasing the probability of a successful resolution of the incident.

In order to deliver an effective integrated multi-agency operational response plan, the following key steps must be undertaken:

Identification of hazards – this will begin from the initial call received by a control room and will continue as first responders arrive on scene. Information and intelligence gathered by individual agencies must be disseminated to all first responders and control rooms effectively.

The trainer should emphasise the use of the mnemonic M/ETHANE which will assist in a common approach.

Identification of the tasks – each individual agency should identify and consider the specific tasks to be achieved within its own role and responsibilities.

Dynamic Risk Assessment – undertaken by individual agencies, reflecting the tasks/objectives to be achieved, the hazards that have been identified and the likelihood of harm from those hazards.

Apply control measures – each agency should consider and apply appropriate control measures to ensure any risk is as low as reasonably practicable.

Integrated multi-agency operational response plan – the development of this plan should consider the outcomes of the hazard assessment, and service risk assessments within the context of the agreed priorities for the incident.

Recording of Decision – the outcomes of the joint assessment of risk should be recorded, together with the identified priorities and the agreed multi-agency response plan, when resources permit. It is acknowledged that in the early stages of the incident this may not be possible, but it should be noted that post-incident scrutiny inevitably focuses on the earliest decision making.

Scenario group work

The trainer is to hand out the **Risk task sheet** to the delegates in their joint interoperability groups; each group has the same questions.

They should have 20 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 20 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.5: Powers, policies and procedures for operational and tactical command

Duration

60 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to generic powers, policies and procedures when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify what generic powers, policies and procedures need to be considered in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Recognise the need for accountability and the necessity of keeping an accurate audit trail of decisions made
- Recognise the generic powers, policies and procedures within a given major incident scenario.

Resources

- Powers, policies and procedures PowerPoint
- Powers, policies and procedures scenario task sheet
- Police Service – Striking the balance between operational and health and safety duties in the police service: an explanatory note
- Fire and Rescue Service – Striking the balance between operational and health and safety duties in the Fire and Rescue Service

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Note: The trainer should explain that not every agency specific power, policy or procedure can be mentioned given the time frame of the course. This lesson seeks to highlight the powers, procedures and policies which are common to all three blue light services. Further powers, policies and procedures can be found in the **Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook**.

Background notes for stage three

The trainer should explain that in the context of a joint response, a common understanding of any relevant powers, policies, capabilities and procedures is essential in order that the activities of one service complement, and do not compromise, the approach of the other services.

Background notes for Civil Contingencies Act 2004

Overview of the Act

The trainer should explain that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.

The Act is separated into two substantive parts:

- Part 1: focuses on local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders.
- Part 2: focuses on emergency powers, establishing a modern framework for the use of special legislative measures that might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies.

Source: Cabinet Office (2004) Civil Contingencies Act 2004: A Short Guide (Revised)

The following non-statutory guidance supports and underpins the CCA 2004:

- Emergency Preparedness and
- Emergency Response and Recovery.

Background notes for The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (number 5 in Powers Policy and Procedures)

The trainer should explain that category two responders are less likely to be involved in detailed planning but are likely to be heavily involved in responding to incidents that impact on their own sector.

The trainer should facilitate a discussion around the sector nature of Cat 2 responders, for example rail operating companies' utility suppliers or pipeline operators. Trainers should include this to local category two responders.

Background notes for The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Part One)

The trainer should explain that the above definition of an emergency focuses on the risks responder agencies face in the 21st century. The definition of emergency in the **CCA 2004** (as shown on the slide) focuses on the consequences of emergencies.

The definition of a major incident has changed and is drawn from interoperability the joint doctrine edition two.

When incidents are of such a nature that they severely test the response arrangements of responder agencies and require a special mobilisation of their resources, most are likely to declare a major incident. A major incident may be declared by an agency or jointly. It is feasible that only one service may determine an emergency as a major incident, based on the type of incident and scale of their resources required. This may not necessarily mean it is a major incident for all other services.

Background notes for Human Rights Act 1998

This means that the responder agencies must interpret and apply their powers in a manner which is compatible with the rights contained within the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

- Responders should always be able to justify their decision-making process in regard to the use of powers.
- Always remember to document decisions or the advice given in the decision log. What was the rationale behind making that decision at the time? What was the advice/decision given?

Positive obligations in human rights law denote a State's obligation to engage in an activity to secure the effective enjoyment of a fundamental right, as opposed to the concept of the 'negative' obligation which requires the State to refrain from interference with a Convention right.

Background notes for ECHR Article 2

The trainer should explain that should a major incident go to an inquiry, it will also be necessary to investigate the **planning of the operation and its control**, including the question whether the commanders had acted adequately so as to **minimise the risk of loss of life**.

Article 2 of the ECHR imposes a positive duty on the State and public authorities (including the emergency services) to protect the right to life. Where there is a real and immediate risk to life, which the state authorities know or ought to know of, they must take appropriate measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, may be expected to avoid that risk. This is the principle established in the case of **Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245**, (paragraph 116)). **Osman Case law can be found in the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Training – Legislation Guide and Handbook.**

If the authorities fail to do all that can reasonably be expected of them to do, then this may amount to an infringement of the positive obligation under Article 2.

In relation to major incidents, there will be a duty on those in charge to protect the lives of the responder agency personnel at the scene, and a duty to prevent further harm to those already injured in the incident.

Commanders will need to take into consideration a number of factors, including the risks of the incident type, the information about the incident available at the time, the number of casualties, and the capability of appropriately trained deployable personnel at their disposal.

All decisions taken by commanders must be fully accountable, must be logged appropriately and made with the appropriate authority. The acronym PLAN is useful when making any decisions which must be proportionate, have a legal basis, be accountable and be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.

The trainer should point out that this aligns to the Central Pentagon of the JDM.

Source: Westlaw.co.uk

The quote which appears on the scene upon a click of the mouse, is taken from the Peer Review of Operation Bridge; Response to Derrick Bird Shootings (2010) explaining that there was a priority to stop Bird rather than render first aid to the casualties.

Background notes for ECHR Article 8

The trainer should explain that ECHR Article 8 protects an individual's right to respect for private and family life. It's a qualified right, which means any interference by a public authority must be in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society in pursuit of one or more 'legitimate aims' such as public safety or the prevention of disorder or crime.

- This places a responsibility on responder agencies, especially the police, to establish an operational purpose for collecting, recording and retaining personal information.
- Proportionality is also important to the management of information – the greater the interference with an individual's privacy the higher the threshold required – particularly relevant with collection of information by covert and intrusive means. **The action taken should be no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.**
- Commanders should have regard to their duty to protect the public when managing information, particularly those members of society such as vulnerable adults and children who are less able than others to protect themselves. (Public Protection)

The trainer should explain that this means in reality:

Formal information-sharing agreements (ISA) may exist between some or all responding agencies, but such existence does not prohibit sharing of information outside of these ISAs.

- There should be a specific purpose for sharing information
- Information shared needs to be proportionate to the purpose and no more than necessary
- Inform the recipient if any of the information is potentially unreliable or inaccurate

Background notes for duty of care

The trainer should explain that a duty of care can arise in a number of situations. Consideration should be given to the following:

The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which sets out a duty of care towards employees and other persons.

If a health and safety offence is committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the organisation, then that person (as well as the organisation) can be prosecuted under section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

Section 3(1) states that "it shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety".

The potential risks to people other than employees (i.e. members of the public) in major incidents should therefore be considered.

It is an offence, under section 33 HSWA 1974 to fail to discharge the section 2 duty, the section 3 duty or to contravene health and safety regulations.

Background notes for decision log/audit trail

The trainer should discuss the following points:

- Commencement of an incident log on notification of the incident. Ensuring that all decisions, rationale and options are logged
- Maintenance, where practicable, of a record log, (e.g. written or audio/video recorded) by each level of command to provide an audit trail of decisions and supporting rationale. **Record what information shared, when, with whom and why**
- The log as subject to disclosure, used for one operation only, and created and maintained in accordance with Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) guidelines (replaced by the Classifications Policy in 2014)
- Integrity of the audit trail to be maintained and integrity of individual logs to be protected.
- Where practicable, having a dedicated loggist present at all times to record all decisions and rationale

  Joint debrief, sharing lessons learnt. Following every incident each service will carry out a debrief. Where services have responded to an emergency jointly, it is expected that the de-brief will also be carried out jointly

Background notes for local decision log procedure

The trainer should explain to the group how single service and joint decisions are recorded in their LRF area. Trainers should also explain how decision logs are stored in their LRF area.

Scenario group work

The trainer is to hand out the **Power, Policies and Procedures task sheet** to the delegates in their joint interoperability groups; each group has the same questions.

They should have 20 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 20 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.6: Options and contingencies for operational and tactical command

Duration

40 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to identifying options and contingencies when carrying out the role of Operational and Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Explain how to identify options and contingencies in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Identify the principles of joint working
- Describe the options for communications at a major incident

Resources

- Options and Contingencies PowerPoint

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should also bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for stage four

The trainer should explain that there will almost always be more than one option to achieve the desired end state, and it is good practice that a range of options are identified and rigorously evaluated. All potential options or courses of action should be evaluated with respect to:

Suitability – does it fit with strategic direction?

Feasibility – in resource terms can it be done?

Acceptability – is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

An action may include deploying resources, briefing (national or social media) or developing a contingency or emergency plan. Whichever option(s) is/are chosen, it is essential that commanders are clear what they are required to carry out and, where the option is time-critical, there should be clearly agreed procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic.

Contingencies are events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to respond to them should they occur. For example, strong evidence may suggest that an emergency is being successfully managed and the impacts safely controlled, but there remains a low likelihood that the situation could deteriorate with significant impacts. Simply hoping for the best is not a defensible option, and a contingency in this case would be to define measures to adjust the response, should the situation deteriorate.

Background notes for principles of joint working

The trainer should explain that the above principles must be applied by responders when they are determining an appropriate course of action and should be reflected in **Joint** or **Standard Operating Procedures** for joint working in the response to, and coordination of an emergency:

Co-location

Co-location of commanders is essential, and allows those commanders to perform the functions of command, control and coordination, face to face, at a shared and easily identified location. At the scene this is known as a Forward Command Post, a location near to the scene where the response by the emergency services to the emergency is managed. **Identification of Commanders using Tabards is essential.**

Communication – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Coordination

Coordination involves the integration of the priorities, resources, decision making and response activities of each emergency service in order to avoid potential conflicts, prevent duplication of effort, minimise risk and promote successful outcomes. Effective coordination requires one service to act in a "lead" capacity for coordination. The lead service will usually be the police service. However, in certain circumstances other services/agencies may be a more appropriate choice, depending upon the nature of the emergency, the phase of the response and the capabilities required.

Joint understanding of risk – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Shared Situational Awareness – trainer should explain that this has already been covered on the course, but is shown on the slide to give the delegates the full joint working picture.

Background notes for tactical advisors

Trainers should ask students to provide examples of specialist advisors, e.g. search advisors, urban search and rescue, firearms tactical advisors, Communications, and CBRN tactical advisors.

Trainers should describe the role of Fire and Ambulance service National Interagency liaison Officers (NILOs).

The trainer should explain the benefits commanders can obtain from involving tactical advisors at the earliest possible stage.

Background notes for contingencies

The trainer should explain that contingencies are events that may occur and the arrangements that are put in place to respond to them should they occur.

The trainer should ask students to provide an example of a contingency they had planned for and how they responded to it.

The trainer should describe that commanders must consider contingencies and have measures in place to respond should the situation deteriorate.

Background notes for options for communications

The trainer should explain the following points:

- There are many forms of communications possible – the best form will normally be face to face but this will not always be possible – for instance all tactical commanders for all agencies may not be present at the same place. Therefore other forms of communications will be required.
- Video conferencing and teleconferencing are often not practical in the field and also will normally not be protected in terms of security.
- Email and electronic messaging can be effective – but it is often not quick enough and it is not clear which messages all have received and are aware of. It is also often not practical in an urgent situation in the field to send bulk messages.
- Mobile phones are often over-relied on by staff. The next slide in a moment will explore some of the issues with them.
- **Airwave** is the preferred tool (where face to face is not practical) as a means of interoperable communications – it is expected, following high profile cases and inquests, to be something that the emergency services are able to use together when required. The trainer should explain that Airwave is the subject of a discrete module.

Background notes to mobile phones

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Mobile phones are extensively used by people as we are all used to them – however they have many weaknesses and are a danger to the safe management of a serious incident.
- Mobile phones are nearly always used as a one-to-one system (not for speaking to a group of people at once) – this can easily result in different people being unaware of the same information – different key personnel can easily end up knowing different versions of the truth.
- They are insecure – mobile phones have been penetrated many times. Voicemail messages are particularly vulnerable. They are only suitable for emergency use and for brief messages when **nothing** else is available.... Airwave is normally available, so this would be no defence.
- Overload: in major incidents the normal networks can easily become overloaded completely and effectively shut down. In extreme cases a conscious decision may be made to do this for security reasons. Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) is a system designed to help emergency services keep a higher priority. MTPAS may not always provide the reliability/resilience required.
- It is easy to select the wrong number (particularly with text messaging) and send the information to the wrong recipient. Sometimes this will not be obvious. People also send texts and assume they have immediately got through. At times of crisis there can be many hours of delay in the delivery of a message. This dangerously gives the impression information has been passed, when in fact it has not been received.
- The trainer should explain that there is a short section of the course that looks at Airwave in more detail.

Background notes for points when communicating

The trainer should explain the following points:

- Clear speech – it is important when working with other agencies to understand that things which make sense immediately to you and your staff may mean something entirely different to others or mean nothing at all. You must go out of your way to make sure the other agencies understand your full meaning.
- Checking understanding is important – people will often naturally agree by nodding or looking knowledgeable – but do they **really** understand?
- Abbreviations are dangerous – HP would obviously mean High Priority – but does it? HP to some Fire Services is a Hydraulic Platform. An ASO is what? It sounds like an AFO (Authorised Firearms Officer) but it actually means Assistant Scientific Officer! It is very important to avoid abbreviations wherever possible so no horrible misunderstanding occurs – it may be obvious to you but is it to the other person?
- Brief succinct messages are really important – this aids quicker updates and communication and leaves less room for mistaken understanding to creep in (although sufficient understanding is important) and makes better use of the finite airspace available.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise. Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.7: Action and review for operational and tactical command

Duration

40 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to taking action and reviewing what happens when carrying out the role of Operational or Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Objectives

- Identify how to take action and review what happens in regard to the Joint Decision Model
- Recognise the importance of a post-event debrief
- Explain the need for joint learning in order to sustain interoperability

Resources

- Action and Review PowerPoint

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

PowerPoint and plenary

The trainer should display the slides and deliver the input for each individual slide based on the notes provided in this trainers guide.

Background notes for stage five

The trainer should explain that building situational awareness, setting direction and evaluating options all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

As the JDM is a continuous loop, it is essential that the results of those actions are fed back into the first box – Gather and share information and intelligence – which establishes shared situational awareness.

This will, in turn, shape any revision to the direction and risk assessment, and the cycle continues.

Background notes for briefing

The trainer should explain that the JDM can be used as a structure for briefings but, as the incident progresses or for planned incidents, a more detailed briefing may be required.

The trainer should explain that the IIMARCH model can be used to develop and deliver briefings. They should explain that it is not a core JESIP product but that it provides a structure commanders may wish to use. They should also explain that this is not a course on producing and delivering briefing, instead this slide seeks to give students an awareness of the IIMARCH model.

The trainer should encourage students to find out if their organisation or LRF has an agreed briefing model.

The trainer should briefly outline the IIMARCH model:

Information – An outline of the information and intelligence known

Intent – The Objective(s) of the operation

Method – The detail of how the objectives will be delivered, who will do what and when it will be done

Administration – Details such as duty times, briefing locations, and equipment required and financial issues

Risk assessment – The joint risk assessment for the operation

Communications – Issue such as the Airwave talkgroups to be used, numbers of dedicated radio operators and similar

Humanitarian – This should cover Human Rights Act 1998 considerations as well as how support could be given to those affected by the operation

Background notes for post event

The trainer should explain to the delegates that if the major incident is over, consideration should be given to the following:

- In order to facilitate operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or some other form), it is essential to keep records. Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh. For this reason a joint hot debrief should be undertaken by commanders as soon as practicable following the event.
- Deal with key welfare issues and document them
- If things went wrong, feedback into own service and get them actioned immediately, without waiting for debrief

Background notes for joint learning

The trainer should explain that joint learning describes both the identification of lessons relevant to joint working, and the process of learning those lessons. Individual services have their own approaches for identifying and learning lessons, but building and sustaining interoperability requires that these lessons are shared in order that unintended consequences (e.g. change that enhances the efficiency of single service operations but to the detriment of the effectiveness of joint operations) are minimised, and opportunities for greater interoperability are realised. This requires a commitment to sharing and prioritising lessons with implications for joint working.

Lesson identification, dissemination and the development of subsequent action plans to make and embed change should be undertaken through a formal debrief process managed by the LRF. Further work is being undertaken by JESIP as part of the legacy arrangements to ensure that lessons identified from joint working are referred to a national Tri-Service Governance Board for consideration. This will ensure that any associated action, either single or joint service, as a result of this joint learning of lessons, is made, and the changes embedded into how organisations operate and individuals behave. Part of this work will be for organisations to consider how they will carry out joint debriefs.

Background notes for joint organisational learning (JOL)

The trainer should describe how the JOL online system provides a single system for all responders to share learning and notable practice that are identified from incidents, exercises or training.

The trainer should explain that JOL should be used to capture learning that involves two or more emergency responders.

The trainer should explain how JOL consists of a national IT platform, a formal assessment and review process to analyse and identify learning and a system of governance that ensures learning identified is used to improve practice.

The trainer should encourage students to find out who is the JOL lead in the students' organisations.

Background notes for concluding on a positive

The trainer should explain that the Shoreham air crash was an example of when responders used JESIP with positive results.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.8 Communication (Airwave)

The trainer should describe the importance of effective operational communications.

Objectives

- Explain why Airwave is the preferred means of Communications
- Explain the importance of engaging a Communication tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage
- Provide an opportunity for students to demonstrate how to change talk groups on an Airwave handset
- Explain how Airwave will be replaced by the Emergency Services Network

Materials

- Communications Power point
- Students' Airwave terminals

Back ground notes for emergency service's network (ESN)

The trainer should explain briefly that AIRWAVE will be replaced by the emergency services network that will provide secure voice and data communications.

> This section is likely to change over the lifetime of the course and trainers should speak with their organisation's lead for ESN to provide students with a brief update of ESN progress.

Background notes for Airwave

Trainers should explain that Airwave is the preferred method of communication. Trainers should describe the advantages Airwave offers over mobile telephones:

Trainers should describe that group calls enable commanders to be all informed without the delays that can arise from multiple telephone calls.

Trainers should describe how emergency services can talk on joint talk groups across services to support the JESIP principals of interoperability.

> Note – Airwave capacity and coverage issues are quite complex and beyond the scope of this course to cover in detail. For this reason the training material highlights the two main issues that can cause communications issues but advises students to contact tactical advisor.

Background notes for issues – coverage

Trainer should describe how in some rural areas or inside buildings there may be no Airwave Coverage and so terminals may not be able to connect to the network at all.

Background notes for options

The trainer should explain that there are a number of methods that can overcome problems with coverage but that they should contact a tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage in an operation.

Background notes for issues – capacity

The trainer should explain that the Airwave network is built to support the normal number of users in a given area with some overhead.

The trainer should explain that if there are many more users in a given area then there may be problems with capacity. The trainer should explain that this is likely to cause issues with users hearing a busy tone when they try to transmit or not hear some messages.

Background notes for options – tactical advisors

The trainer should explain that there are a number of solutions to problems with capacity. The trainer should explain that commanders who are experiencing queuing or who are managing or planning an event that will see many more Airwave users than normal in an area should contact a tactical advisor as soon as possible.

Background notes for talk groups

The trainer should describe how all talkgroups have names which are referred to as Alpha tags. The trainer should explain that to ensure effective communication students should always refer to talkgroup by its Alphatag and not by the number it occupies in the students Airwave terminal. The trainer should explain that this is because other agencies are likely to have the same talkgroups in different positions in their terminals.

Note: trainers are encouraged to use local photographs in this section of the course.

Trainers should describe how alpha tags are made up of a letter describing the sector: P for Police, F for Fire or A for Ambulance, a four letter code to describe which organisation e.g. AVON for Avon and Somerset and then a description of what the talkgroup is e.g. INTEROP1 for an interoperability talk group.

Background notes for 'What is available for the emergency services'

The trainer should describe that there are a number of talk groups available that will enable the emergency services and responder agencies to speak to each other. These include interagency talkgroups and local Emergency services talkgroups.

The trainer should explain that some talkgroups are available all the time whilst others need to be booked for events to ensure there is no confliction.

Trainers should describe that commanders should contact a tactical advisor at the earliest possible stage in an incident or if planning an operation to ensure the most effective talkgroups are used.

Background notes for points when communicating

Trainers should explain to students that they should follow the following rules when using Airwave during a multi-agency incident.

- Clear speech should be used
- Acronyms and other specialist language should not be used
- Messages should be brief
- Single service call signs should not be used, instead individuals' and teams should be identifies in plain language. E.g. No BD002A but Police Tactical commander.
- Understanding should be checked

Background notes for interoperability – practice

Trainers should demonstrate how to change talk group to a local interoperability talkgroup, for example ES1 on students' terminals and then allow the group to practise changing talk groups and speaking to one another using Airwave.

Session 1.9: Command consolidation exercise

Duration

80 minutes

Aim

To test and develop the knowledge and understanding of the delegates in relation to the roles, responsibilities and command structures when carrying out the role of Tactical Commander during a major incident.

Trainers should seek to identify a local scenario based upon their LRF risk register. They should use local material to develop a scenario that will enable students to work together and apply the JDM to achieve the objectives shown below.

For initial course trainers may choose to use the 'Festival' or 'RTC' consolidation exercise developed by the College in the first edition of the training, although it is preferable to use a local exercise.

Objectives

- Identify the need to declare a major incident in a given scenario
- Explain the role of an Operational or Tactical Commander in a given major incident scenario
- Discuss the underpinning rationale in an Tactical plan evidenced around the Joint Decision Model for a given scenario

Resources

- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme Doctrine
  Hand out
- Joint l Commander Consolidation exercise title PowerPoint based upon the existing tactical commander course
- Tactical Commander Consolidation exercise task sheet based upon the existing tactical commander course
- Consolidation Exercise task answer sheet

Delivery method

Introduction

Give a brief overview of the session's aims and objectives.

It is important that an individual taking on the role of Tactical Commander is fully conversant with the role and responsibilities involved. The outcomes of the session should be used at the end of the day to consolidate the learning which the delegates have gone through and check their understanding.

The trainer should bring into the plenaries the answers from the Delegate Research Portfolio activities. (For example, do the delegate answers from the Research Portfolios match up to the classroom discussion? What have the delegates learnt from the discussions to take forward to the workplace?)

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme Doctrine

The trainer should give out to the delegates the **JESIP doctrine handout** and go through it relating it to the lesson content covered on the course, emphasising that following this doctrine will lead to more efficient and effective coordination of emergency response, more effective deployment of resources, and improved public confidence in the tri-service response; ultimately saving as many lives as possible.

This doctrine should now be applied to the consolidation exercise.

Group work

The trainer is to pose the question: **'In your groups, you are the Operational and Tactical Commanders for this incident from your own organisations. Please complete the task sheets and be prepared to share your findings with the rest of the classroom group.'**

The trainer should emphasise that the scenario is a vehicle to allow Commanders to work in a joint interoperability environment setting and draw upon and utilise JESIP principles. This spontaneous event is above and beyond that which is prepared for by the Event Management Plan.

The trainer is to hand out the task sheets and the JDM task answer sheet to the delegates in their groups; each group has the same questions.

They have 30 minutes to carry out this task and at the end of this time they will be required to present it to the rest of the group. They may present it in any way they wish, within the time frame.

After the 30 minutes the trainer should ask each team to present their findings to the rest of the group. The trainer should clear up any ambiguities which may arise throughout the presentations and answer any questions the delegates may have.

The trainer should ask each group in turn the answers to each question in the task sheet, which will assist in the shared learning of the whole group. A different team should present first for each question.

Closure

Trainer to answer any questions and clarify any points the delegates may raise.

Trainer is to then revisit the aims and objectives of the session, reiterating the learning points.

Session 1.10: Course closure

Duration

10 minutes

Aim

To allow delegates to recap learning and clarify any outstanding areas.

Objectives

- Provide the delegates with the opportunity to ask questions, clarifying any ambiguities
- Identify new learning that the delegates can apply to working effectively as a Tactical Commander at a major incident.

Delivery method

This is the final session, so the following will need to be carried out:

- Offer delegates the opportunity to ask any remaining questions they may have.
- Complete and collect evaluation forms.